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INTRODUCTION
A traditional account of federalism in the United States places international
law and foreign affairs squarely within the province of the federal government.
Nonetheless, subnational participation in matters of international law and for-
eign affairs is now both a reality and a necessity. From cross-border initiatives
on environmental protection' and health care,2 to state-level divestment legisla-
tion,3 to programs to implement the Kyoto Protocol, 4 the United States speaks
with diverse and divergent voices in the international arena. Moreover, given
the significant areas of jurisdictional authority exercised by the states, the
United States cannot meet its international legal commitments without state
and local cooperation. Thus, a growing body of scholarship considers how best
to engage cities and states in advancing local goals on the international stage
and argues for legislative and jurisprudential initiatives to create and preserve
opportunities for state-level innovation.'
1. See Martha F. Davis, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: States, Municipalities and
International Human Rights, in 2 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: FROM CIVIL
RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS 127, 129 (Cynthia Soohoo, Catherine Albisa & Martha
F. Davis eds., 2008) (describing the Pacific NorthWest Economic Region, an al-
liance of British Columbia, Alberta, Yukon, and the states of Alaska, Idaho, Mon-
tana, Oregon, and Washington). The Pacific NorthWest Economic Region is a
cross-border foundation dedicated to promoting regional collaboration and com-
petitiveness while protecting the region's national resources. See About Us: Back-
ground, PAC. NORTHWEST EcoN. REGION, http://www.pnwer.org/AboutUs/
Background.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
2. See Worktables: Health, XXVIII BORDER GOVERNORS CONF., http://www
.bordergovernorS201o.org/2olo Governors Conference/worktables/worktables
_health.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2011) (describing, inter alia, cross-border health in-
itiatives to track the spread of influenza and improve epidemiological monitoring
in the border region).
3. See Nora Boustany, Sudan Divestment Effort Gains Momentum at State Level,
WASH. PosT, Oct. 7, 20o6, at A12 (noting that, by 2oo6, Maine, Connecticut,
Oregon, Illinois, New Jersey, and California had already passed divestment laws).
4. See, e.g., California Global Warming Solutions Act of 20o6, CAL. HEALTH & SAFE-
TY CODE § 38550 (West 2009); S. 4315, 2009-2010 Leg., 233d Sess. (N.Y. 2009);
Cinnamon Carlarne, Climate Change Policies an Ocean Apart: EU & US Climate
Change Policies Compared, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 435, 445-46 (2006) (noting
that California, New York, and cities like Portland and Philadelphia are adopting
climate change policies based on the Kyoto Protocol).
5. See Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 389 (2009) (advocating for a subsidiarity
approach to human rights treaty implementation); Judith Resnik, Foreign as Do-
mestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in
Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 87 (2007) (arguing for an
abandonment of the "dormant foreign affairs" approach to preemption); Robert
A. Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 811, 812-13 (2008) (sug-
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The current discussion lacks, however, any kind of systematic understand-
ing of the conditions under which states and localities view themselves as actors
in the international system. One goal of this Article is to begin to understand
the ways in which subnational entities engage with international law and, con-
versely, the ways in which they do not. I address this question through an
examination of legislative and executive participation in the implementation of
international human rights treaties.' A closer look at state and local efforts to
implement these treaties exposes an apparent paradox. Although subnational
engagement with these treaties is generally limited, it has occurred more fre-
quently with respect to unratified human rights treaties than it has with those
that have been ratified and are thus the "law of the land" under the Supremacy
Clause.7 In other words, states and localities have taken fewer legislative and
administrative actions to implement the commitments of the binding human
rights instruments than to implement those that are nonbinding. I contend that
understanding the sources of this contradiction will help to identify strategies
for promoting broader subnational participation in implementing the ratified
gesting that the federal government "seek to accommodate an overlap of state and
federal regulation and thus should be wary of preempting state law").
6. This Article is part of a larger project, which examines strategies for improving
U.S. compliance with its international human rights commitments by increasing
state and local participation. See Johanna Kalb, Dynamic Federalism in Human
Rights Treaty Implementation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1025 (2010) [hereinafter Kalb,
Dynamic Federalism]; Johanna Kalb, Human Rights Treaties in State Courts: The
International Prospects of State Constitutionalism After Medellin, 115 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1051 (2011) [hereinafter Kalb, Human Rights Treaties in State Courts]. This
piece focuses on these types of activities both because they are the most common
and visible, see Martha F. Davis, Upstairs, Downstairs: Subnational Incorporation of
International Human Rights Law at the End of an Era, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 419
(2008) [hereinafter Davis, Upstairs, Downstairs], and because the
non-self-execution provisions of treaties have limited the formal role that state
courts play in implementing these instruments, thereby creating a barrier to their
participation in this project that the other branches of state and local government
do not face. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing these condi-
tions on ratification); see also Penny J. White, Legal, Political, and Ethical Hurdles
to Applying International Human Rights Law in the State Courts of the United States
(and Arguments for Scaling Them), 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 937 (2003). This is not to
suggest that state courts have no role in treaty implementation. Professor Martha
Davis has proposed that state courts could engage with these treaties as informa-
tive, if not binding, sources of law in interpreting their own constitutions. See
Martha Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and International Hu-
man Rights, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 359, 371-75 (2oo6) [hereinafter Da-
vis, The Spirit of Our Times]; id. at 371-72 ("[T]he similarities between interna-
tional law provisions and state constitutional provisions granting affirmative
rights support using transnational human rights norms to interpret state law.").
7. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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human rights instruments and for engaging states and cities with the United
States' international obligations more generally.
Part II begins with a description of the paradox. I review some commonly
discussed examples of legislative and executive engagement with the unratified
human rights treaties, and then contrast this experience with that of the ratified
instruments. Despite the ratified treaties' greater claim to legitimacy and the
space created within them for state participation through the ratification
process, they have failed to stimulate significant subnational interest. This is
true even among the "incorporationists"'-those states and localities that favor
increased substantive and procedural engagement with international human
rights instruments and that are often quite active with respect to matters of for-
eign affairs and international law.
The seemingly contradictory behavior of the incorporationists belies the
most common and obvious explanations that are usually provided for the
states' failure to engage. While political resistance to or ignorance of interna-
tional human rights law may account for the lack of activity in many or most
states, it is not an adequate explanation for the silence by the incorporationists.
I posit an alternative theory that focuses on how states and localities view their
roles and responsibilities within our federalist system. I contend that states and
localities continue to view the United States' treaty commitments through a
traditional "dualist" federalist lens, which neatly divides areas of jurisdictional
authority between the states and the federal government, leaving treaty imple-
mentation entirely to federal control. This perspective resolves the apparent
paradox: Acting within a dualist framework of divided state and federal respon-
sibility, even the incorporationists view their role in the treaty project as limited
to encouraging the federal adoption of human rights standards.
The dualist perspective poses a barrier to increased state and local partici-
pation in implementing these instruments and thus threatens the United States'
ability to reach full compliance with its international obligations. In order to
move beyond this dualist orientation, however, a deeper understanding of the
range of possible cooperative federal-subnational relationships is necessary. Part
III reframes the relationship between a traditional dualist view of federalism,
which seeks to create clear lines delineating exclusive areas of jurisdictional au-
thority, and its converse, "dynamic" federalism, in which states and the federal
government are presumed to have no areas of exclusive jurisdictional control,
but rather relate through a series of overlapping and ongoing regulatory inter-
actions. By contrast to the position advanced in the existing literature, which
treats dualism and dynamic federalism as binary opposites (and thus places all
types of federal-subnational collaboration in the "dynamic" category), I consid-
er dualism and dynamism as the extreme points on a continuum of cooperative
federal-state relationships. Viewing the range of possibilities as a spectrum,
rather than as a binary choice, permits a more exact characterization of the
8. See Melish, supra note 5' at 421.
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dynamics of each of these interactions and a deeper understanding of the condi-
tions that facilitate their success or failure.
With this new framework in place, I review three oft-discussed successes of
federal-subnational cooperation in treaty implementation as case studies. Un-
der a binary understanding of federalist relationships, the existence of ongoing
and overlapping regulatory authority in the treaty's implementation scheme
would qualify each of these models of interaction as dynamic. I demonstrate,
however, that the success of these projects is actually attributable to their rela-
tive susceptibility to a dualist division of responsibilities between the federal and
subfederal governments. That is, these projects work because they fit easily into
a framework that relies on clear lines of jurisdictional authority.
This perspective helps to explain why the implementation of the human
rights treaties is so challenging. Many of the human rights treaties are not natu-
rally conducive to a dualist approach because of the broad and cross-cutting na-
ture of the rights that they protect. I therefore suggest that a dynamic approach,
which has yet to be applied in the treaty context, is necessary to promote subna-
tional involvement in implementing the ratified human rights treaties, and
could help to advance the project of treaty implementation more generally. A
dynamic approach would focus on creating and promoting ongoing and over-
lapping implementation activities toward reaching the treaty goals at multiple
jurisdictional levels, both horizontally across states and vertically between
states, municipalities, and the federal government.
Part IV focuses on strategies for creating dynamism in order to maximize
the possibilities of federal-subnational partnerships. Most of the literature in
this area to date has been descriptive and normative in that it attempts to har-
monize the theoretical federalism framework with the reality on the ground. My
focus in this final Part is prescriptive: How can dynamism be generated in order
to solve a particular policy challenge? Drawing on lessons from the case studies
of successful subnational engagement, I begin to suggest strategies for breaking
down the barriers that prevent fuller engagement with the ratified human rights
treaties, both among the incorporationists and other subnational actors.
1. THE PARADOX OF SUBNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES
In recent years, a handful of incorporationist states and localities have
demonstrated an interest in promoting domestic acceptance and implementa-
tion of international human rights law. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, these
efforts have been almost entirely focused on the international human rights in-
struments that the United States has not yet ratified. This appears to be true
even though the ratified treaties explicitly carve out a space for state and local
participation in the realization of their commitments. This Part surveys the pat-
terns of subnational behavior with respect to these instruments and attempts to
explain the apparent paradox of state and local participation in human rights
treaty implementation.
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A. Identifying the Paradox
Not all human rights treaties have equal status under United States law.
There are some treaties that the United States has signed, but not ratified.9 That
is, the President has negotiated and signed the treaty on behalf of the United
States, but the Senate has yet to ratify it. Then there are instruments that the
United States has signed and ratified, but that have not been implemented
through federal legislation.o Finally, there are treaties that have been signed,
ratified, and implemented through federal legislation." Complicating the pic-
ture further is the fact that the United States often ratifies treaties with a pack-
age of reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) that purport to
limit their domestic effect in a variety of ways." For example, many of these ra-
tified treaties are deemed "non-self-executing," which at a minimum means
that their guarantees may not be enforced against noncompliant states in state
or federal courts." Additionally, many of these treaties were ratified with a res-
9. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature NOV. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]; Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
ICESCR].
io. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S.
195 [hereinafter CERD].
n1. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091, 1093 (2006) (providing for the domestic implementation of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Conven-
tion]); 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (20o6) (providing for the domestic implementation of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. lo, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
CAT]).
12. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 341-48 (1995) (describing the frequently
used RUDs and their implications).
13. See id. at 346 ("[T]he declaration that a convention shall be non-self-executing is
designed to keep its own judges from judging the human rights conditions in the
United States by international standards."); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Four
Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 695 (1995) ("At a general
level, a self-executing treaty may be defined as a treaty that may be enforced in the
courts without prior legislation by Congress, and a non-self-executing treaty, con-
versely, as a treaty that may not be enforced in the courts without prior legislative
'implementation.'"). The Supreme Court has recently indicated that non-self-
executing treaties may not even be domestic law absent federal implementing leg-
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ervation stating that the United States' adherence to an international human
rights treaty should not effect-or promise-change in existing law or prac-
tice.'4
Most of the scholarly discussion of subnational participation in human
rights treaty implementation has focused on a handful of examples of state and
local engagement with the unratified treaties. Most frequently referenced are
efforts related to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women (CEDAW),'5 a treaty that was signed by President Jim-
my Carter in 1980 but has yet to be ratified." CEDAW requires its signatories to
take action to "ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the
purposes of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men."17 Frustrated by the
national government's failure to ratify the treaty, a number of domestic civil so-
ciety organizations have campaigned to encourage states and localities to pass
resolutions calling for the ratification of CEDAW.'" As a result, by 2010, eigh-
teen states and the territory of Guam, forty-seven cities, and nineteen counties
had passed legislation related to CEDAW.'9 Nonbinding "ratification resolu-
islation. See infra note ioo and accompanying text (discussing the possible impli-
cations of the Court's decision in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (20o8)).
14. See Henkin, supra note 12, at 341.
15. See, e.g., Stacy Laira Lozner, Diffusion of Local Regulatory Innovations: The San
Francisco CEDAW Ordinance and the New York City Human Rights Initiative, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 768, 777-90 (2004); Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of Ameri-
can Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73 Mo. L. REV. 1105, 1110 (2008); Cynthia
Soohoo & Suzanne Stolz, Bringing Theories of Human Rights Change Home, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 493 (2oo8).
16. See Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorpora-
tion of Human Rights Law in the United States, 1so U. PA. L. REV. 245, 258 (2001).
17. CEDAW, supra note 9, at 16. CEDAW also has an optional protocol, which per-
mits individuals or groups, after exhausting any available remedies at the national
level, to file complaints directly with the CEDAW committee, which is then au-
thorized to initiate investigations. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/54/ 4 , at 3 (Oct. 15, 1999).
18. This coalition generated model resolutions to 'recognize' equal rights, to 'eschew
all forms of discrimination on the basis of sex,"' and to lend support for ratifica-
tion. Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues,
and Federalism's Multiple Points of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1640 (2006) (quoting
CEDAW: THE TREATY FOR THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (RIGHTS THAT BENEFIT THE
ENTIRE COMMUNITY) 16-17, 67-72 (Leila Rassekh Milani, Sarah C. Albert & Karina
Purushotma eds., 2004)).
19. COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN RIGHTS INST. & INT'L Ass'N OF OFFICIAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AGENCIES, STATE AND LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS AGENCIES: RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR ADVANCING OPPORTUNITY AND EQUALITY THROUGH AN INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK app. C at 25 [hereinafter COLUMBIA HUMAN
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tions" are the most common form of local engagement with CEDAW. That is,
"[m]ost of these provisions are expressive or hortatory, calling for the United
States to ratify CEDAW."2 o
A handful of cities have gone further, taking affirmative steps toward local
implementation of CEDAW. San Francisco has the most extensive program,
which is illustrative of one way in which these types of treaties may be imple-
mented domestically." The San Francisco ordinance tracks the language of
CEDAW, defining discrimination against women as any
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex that has
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoy-
ment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a
basis of equality of men and women, of human rights or fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other
field."
The ordinance also requires that selected city departments undertake
"gender analysis to identify areas of gender discrimination in their internal
practices and service delivery."" These analyses have allowed the city to identify
facially neutral practices with gender-differentiated impacts and have resulted
in the modification of various city programs to increase access.2 4 Following San
RIGHTS INST.], available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download
?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file-id=153843 (list compiled by Sarah Albert of
the YWCA and Billie Heller of the National Committee on CEDAW).
20. See Resnik, supra note 18, at 1641.
21. Notably, one of the challenges of these treaties is understanding the meaning of
implementation in the context of the treaties' broad principles. The San Francisco
experience provides one potential lens, although by no means the only one, for
thinking about the requirements of implementation. Martha Davis has developed
an account of the San Francisco experience through interviews with some of the
city officials and advocates involved with its implementation. Davis, supra note 1,
at 134-40; see also Lozner, supra note 15.
22. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12K.2(d) (2000), available at http://www.sfgov3.org/
index.aspx?page=130; cf CEDAW, supra note 9, at 16. As Davis points out, in its
focus on discriminatory effects, the legislation goes farther than the U.S. constitu-
tional guarantees. Davis, supra note 1, at 136.
23. Davis, supra note i, at 137.
24. As of the time of Davis's account, published in 2008, six city agencies had com-
pleted a gender analysis, which resulted in changes in the ways in which some
government programs were administered. Id. For example, the Art Commission
learned that the reason that primarily male artists were funded for large public
arts projects was not "societal imbalances" as it had previously believed, but rather
that its lottery for spots was set up in a way that made it less accessible for appli-
cants who are primary caregivers for children. Id. The program was therefore
changed. The gender review also resulted in changes in the types of services pro-
vided by the Juvenile Probation Department. Once the agency's standard con-
sciously accounted for girls, as well as boys, it began to provide services targeting
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Francisco, Los Angeles passed a similar ordinance implementing CEDAW,
and New York City has considered legislation that would adopt CEDAW prin-
ciples." Prompted in part by these initiatives, and the advocacy of civil society
organizations, the Senate is again holding hearings on the ratification of
CEDAW.2 1
A similar, albeit less extensive, pro-ratification movement is afoot with
respect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). CRC seeks to en-
sure that the guarantees of the other major human rights treaties-civil, politi-
cal, economic, social, and humanitarian-are extended to fit the particular
needs of children.21 "Among the issues addressed by the Convention that are
young women, such as sexual assault counseling and pregnancy prevention ser-
vices. Id. at 138.
25. L.A., Cal., Ordinance 175735 (Dec. 24, 2003), available at http://clkrep.lacity.org/
councilfiles/oo-0398-S2_ORD_175735_O2-o8-2004.pdf.
26. See Davis, supra note 1, at 139; see also Reintroduction of the Human Rights GOAL
at New York City Council, N.Y.C. Hum. RTs. INITIATIVE (June 29, 2010),
http://www.nychri.org/ReintroductionoftheHumanRightsGOAL.htm. As Davis
explains, "Like the San Francisco initiative, the New York City proposal draws on
international human rights law for inspiration and basic standards, while tailoring
the provisions to local implementation needs." Davis, supra note 1, at 139. The
Human Rights Government Operations Audit Law (GOAL) would require that
city agencies take a proactive approach to preventing discrimination. It also calls
for the creation of a public-private Human Rights Advisory Committee to oversee
city compliance. Id. Advocates have suggested that this kind of approach is neces-
sary "to address the cumulative effects of unintentional biases in city decision
making-effects that are often beyond the reach of litigation, but that have a sig-
nificant effect on the participation of women and minorities in the life of the
city." Id. at 140. Nonetheless, despite the San Francisco experience, Mayor
Bloomberg has promised to veto the bill should it ever be adopted by the city
council and suggested that the proposed ordinance is overbroad and duplicative
of existing civil rights guarantees. Id.
27. The Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law
held hearings on the ratification of CEDAW on November 18, 2010. Witnesses tes-
tifying before the Subcommittee included Marcia Greenberger, Co-President of
the National Women's Law Center; actress Geena Davis, founder of The Geena
Davis Institute on Gender in Media; Wahzma Frogh of the Afghan Women's
Network; Melanne Verveer, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for the Office of Global
Women's Issues, U.S. Department of State; Samuel Bagenstos, Principal Deputy
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice; and Steven
Groves of the Heritage Foundation. For transcripts of the witness testimony, the
member statements, and a webcast of the hearings, see Women's Rights Are Hu-
man Rights: U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JU-
DICIARY (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id
=e655f9e28o9e5476862f735dal64da79.
28. CRC, supra note 9.
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given greater clarification are the juvenile justice standards, the relationship
among the child, the family, and the state, the child's right to privacy, and the
extent to which other civil and political rights belong to children ... ."29 As of
early 2009, nine cities and five states had passed resolutions in support of
CRC.30 Some jurisdictions, like Chicago, have committed to "advance policies
and practices that are in harmony with the principles of JCRC] in all city agen-
cies and organizations that address issues directly affecting the City's child-
ren."3' A handful of cities, most notably Denver and New York City, have joined
the Child Friendly Cities Initiative of the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF), which is designed to implement the principles of CRC locally to
make cities "a more livable place for children."" The Denver Child and Youth
Friendly City Initiative, for example, aims to promote a healthy environment
for child development and to ensure that the voices of children and youth are
included in city planning. The organization's leadership includes representa-
tives from the mayor's office, as well as Denver-based youth organizations, and
29. Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Construction and Application of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 28 LL.M. 1448 (19 89)-Global Cases and
Administrative Decisions, 20 A.L.R. FED. 2d 95 (2007).
30. See CHILDREN & FAMILY JUSTICE CTR., NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW,
ToOLKIT FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
BY CITY COUNCILS AND STATE LEGISLATURES 8, available at http://www.law
.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/documents/CRC-TOOLKIT-11-20o9.pdf. By this
count, the list of cities included Austin, Texas; Cambridge, Massachusetts; Cleve-
land, Ohio; Detroit, Michigan; Kansas City, Missouri; Minneapolis, Minnesota;
New York, New York; San Diego, California; and Savannah, Georgia. The list of
state governments included Hawaii, Rhode Island, Vermont, South Carolina, and
New York. However, even simply identifying the number of CRC initiatives is
challenging. Another source indicates that around the same time, such initiatives
existed in nine cities and two states. See U.S. COMM. FOR UNICEF, U.S. ORGANI-
ZATIONS WHICH ENDORSE THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
(Apr. 5, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/public-II/
human-rights/entitiessuppcrc.pdf; see also Sally Engle Merry et al., Law from Be-
low: Women's Human Rights and Social Movements in New York City, 44 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 101, 109 fl.2 (2010); Chicago City Council Passed Resolution Supporting
the Convention on the Rights for the Child, U.S. Hum. RTs. FUND (Feb. 17,
2009), http://www.ushumanrightsfund.org/news/Chicago-city-council-passed
-resolution-supporting-/ (adding Chicago to the existing list).
31. City of Chicago Resolution Adopting the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child (Feb. n1, 2009), available at http://www.luc.edu/chrc/pdfs/City-ofChicago
-Resolution.pdf.
32. Examples of CFC Initiatives: United States of America, CHILD FRIENDLY CITIES
(UNICEF), http://www.childfriendlycities.org/en/to-learn-more/examples-of-cfc
-initiatives/united-states-of-america (last visited June 13, 2011).
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it has a Youth Steering Committee to ensure that children have a direct voice in
the development of the initiative. 3
Advocates have also begun organizing to implement the International Co-
venant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),14 which seeks to
promote human dignity and equality by guaranteeing all persons a set of basic
positive rights including, inter alia, adequate food, housing, healthcare, and
education, as well as the right to participate in cultural life." As of yet, no state
or local legislative initiatives appear to have been enacted that specifically call
for or adopt ICESCR principles." One explanation may be that most advocates
are currently focused on using a general human rights framework (rather than
specific treaty instruments) to argue for state-level reforms related to the specif-
ic areas of housing, healthcare, and other fundamental social rights. Thus, even
if these efforts are successful, reference to the Covenant may not be explicit in
the final regulation, statute, or decision."
Finally, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD),3 8 which, like CRC, seeks to ensure access to the full range of human
rights to a particularly threatened group, is a new instrument, but several
33. Id.
34. See Lauren Groth, Engendering Protection: An Analysis of the 2oo9 Kampala Con-
vention and its Provisions for Internally Displaced Women, 23 INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
221, 237 (2011).
35. See ICESCR, supra note 9.
36. The National Lawyers Guild and the Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute have de-
veloped a toolkit for activists working to promote the adoption of ICESCR ratifi-
cation resolutions locally. See Resources and Documents on the Human Rights
Framework, NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD INT'L COMM., http://www.nlginternational
.org/news/article.php?nid=360 (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
37. For example, the City-County Health Board of Lewis and Clark County, Mon-
tana, adopted a resolution in December 2008 stating that "health care is a 'basic
human right' and that everyone has a 'right to access to a universal health care
system."' See Health Reform from the Bottom Up, HELENA INDEP. REc. (Dec. 14,
2008), http://www.helenair.com/news/local/article37ec24a-197d-53fe-eb-7eb33
64b4ccb.html (quoting the ordinance). The Board was exploring options for ful-
filling this goal locally in cooperation with the Montana Human Rights Network
and the National Economic and Social Rights Initiative. Id. The state of Vermont
has also passed a Universal Access to Healthcare Act in direct response to the
"Healthcare Is a Human Right" campaign of the Vermont Workers' Center. See
Press Release, Vt. Workers' Ctr., Final Passage of Vermont Universal Health Care
Bill Marks Success of Growing Human Rights Movement (May 5, 2011),
http://www.workerscenter.org/node/861. Although ICESCR includes the right to
health care as one of its commitments, see ICESCR, supra note 9, at 8, the Act re-
fers only to the notion of human rights generally and does not refer to the rela-
tionship between health care and human rights at all. See 2010 Vt. Acts & Resolves,
No. 128, available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2o1o/Acts/ACT128.pdf.
38. G.A. Res. 61/io6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/ho6 (Dec. 13, 2006).
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organizations have launched programs focused on helping advocates work to-
ward implementation and ratification. 9
The subnational engagement with these unratified treaties contrasts with
that of the ratified instruments, which have prompted fewer subnational legisla-
tive and executive branch implementation efforts and resulted in less advocacy
by subnational actors. With respect to the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 40 and
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Genocide Convention), 41 this may be unsurprising, given that these two trea-
ties have been implemented through federal legislation, which may seem to
obviate the need for state action given that federal law also binds the states. 42
However, the lack of activity by the incorporationist cities and states with
39. For example, Disabled Peoples' International is an organization dedicated to
promoting the human rights of persons with disabilities. It has designed toolkits
both for CRPD ratification and implementation. See Tool Kits, DISABLED
PEOPLES' INT'L, http://www.dpi.org/lang-en/index?page=19 (last visited Feb. 9,
2011). The toolkit on ratification provides an explanation of the rights guaranteed
by the Convention, explains how the process of adoption and ratification works
domestically and internationally, and provides messaging and a strategy for orga-
nizing for ratification. ICRPD Ratification Toolkit, DISABLED PEOPLES' INT'L,
http://www.icrpd.net/ratification/en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2011). The
toolkit on implementation focuses on helping advocates to evaluate their own en-
vironment in terms of the protections of CRPD and to develop a concrete vision
of the full realization of those rights. ICRPD Implementation Toolkit, DISABLED
PEOPLES' INT'L, http://www.icrpd.net/implementation/en/index.htm (last visited
Feb. 9, 2011).
40. CAT was created to more effectively combat the struggle against all torture and
any other types of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
throughout the world . . . " CAT, supra note n1, at 113.
41. The Genocide Convention was created to ensure that genocide could be prosecut-
ed as a crime whether it occurred in a time of war or peace. See Helen Fein,
Discriminating Genocide from War Crimes: Vietnam and Afghanistan Reexamined,
22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 29, 30-31 (1993). The Convention punishes those who
actually commit genocide, those who conspire or attempt to commit genocide,
and those who incite or comply with genocide. Genocide Convention, supra note
ii, art. 3.
42. This may not necessarily be true. Professor John Parry has demonstrated that the
statutes implementing CAT adopt an approach that is "more restrictive" than "the
text of the Convention ... would support." John T. Parry, Torture Nation, Torture
Law, 97 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1049 (2009). Thus, there might still be space left for state
and local advocacy with respect to the United States' satisfaction of its interna-
tional obligations, especially given the recent controversy surrounding the use of
torture in the war on terror. The CAT implementing legislation specifically re-
serves space for state and local regulation of the same areas. See 18 U.S.C. § 234oB
(2006) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as precluding the application
of State or local laws on the same subject .... ).
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respect to the other ratified treaties, such as the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 43 and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),44 is anomalous for
two reasons. First, these treaties would seem to have a stronger claim to domes-
tic legitimacy than the unratified instruments simply by virtue of their ratifica-
tion. Ratification requires not only the assent of the executive but also the
support of two-thirds of the Senate, giving these treaties more democratic
imprimatur. 5 And by the terms of Article VI of the Constitution, "all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the Supreme Law of the Land .... 4
Second, these treaties were ratified in a way that specifically anticipated
state and local participation in the treaty implementation process. Both CERD
and ICCPR require domestic implementation, which may be done either
through "making the treaty itself part of domestic law" or "by mak[ing] effec-
tive the rights guaranteed by the treaty in. .. domestic law."#4 Under ICCPR,
the United States is obliged to refrain from violating the rights guaranteed by
the instrument and to take steps to prevent others from doing so, including, if
necessary, ensuring that these rights are adequately protected in domestic law."
Article 4 of CERD requires that the United States
(1) review and eliminate any laws or policies that have the purpose or
effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination; (2) prohibit by
all appropriate means racial discrimination by others, including private
actors; (3) when necessary, adopt "special and concrete measures"
aimed at equalizing the status of racial and ethnic minorities in order
to ameliorate the present effects of past discrimination; and (4) pass
laws prohibiting hate speech and incitement and outlawing groups en-
gaging in those activities.49
43. CERD, supra note io.
44. ICCPR, supra note io.
45. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
46. U.S. CONsT. art VI, cl. 2.
47. William M. Carter, Jr., Treaties as Law and the Rule of Law: The Judicial Power To
Compel Domestic Treaty implementation, 69 MD. L. REV. 344, 371-72 (2010).
48. Id. at 372; see also ICCPR, supra note lo, at 173 ("Each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Cove-
nant . . . ."); id. at 173-74 ("Where not already provided for by existing [domestic
law], each State Party ... undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance
with its constitutional processes . .. to adopt such legislative or other measures as
may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Cove-
nant.").
49. Carter, supra note 47, at 373 (citing CERD, supra note to, at 218, 220). Professor
William Carter notes that the obligations of Article 4 are likely unconstitutional
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Because of domestic political concerns, the United States adopted CERD
and ICCPR with a "federalism" clause, which purports to leave treaty enforce-
ment to the states in those areas of law traditionally reserved to them."o The
federalism understanding attached to ICCPR, for example, explains:
[T]he United States understands that this Covenant shall be imple-
mented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legis-
lative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and
otherwise by the state and local governments; to the extent that state
and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the
Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal sys-
tem to the end that the competent authorities of the state or local gov-
ernments may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the
Covenant.51
According to the first report on ICCPR compliance that the United States
submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, this provision
means that federal authority is limited in "matters such as education, public
health, business organization, work conditions, marriage and divorce, the care
of children and exercise of the ordinary police power."" Although these areas
are the subject of both state and federal regulation at present, the federal
government continues to rely on these provisions to excuse further action on its
treaty obligations.
Under international law, the inclusion of a federalism understanding does
not prevent the United States from accepting a treaty;" however, its presence
means that "[if states fail to implement international treaty provisions that
address areas traditionally reserved to them, the United States cannot, as a prac-
and therefore could not have become effective domestically upon ratification. Id.
at 373 n-149.
50. See 140 CONG. REc. 14,326 (1994) (CERD); 138 CONG. REC. 8071 (1992) (ICCPR).
51. 138 CONG. REc. 8071 (1992). Similar language was adopted with the ratification of
CERD. 140 CONG. REC. 14,326 (1994).
52. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1993: United
States of America, ! 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (Aug. 24, 1994), at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Symbol/da936c49ed8a9a8f8025655coo528cf.
53. Henkin, supra note 12, at 346 ("International law requires the United States to car-
ry out its treaty obligations but, in the absence of special provision, does not pre-
scribe how, or through which agencies, they shall be carried out .... [T]he United
States [therefore can] leave the implementation of any treaty provision to the
states [whilel remain[ing] internationally responsible for any failure of imple-
mentation."); see also Margaret Thomas, "Rogue States" Within American Bounda-
ries: Remedying State Noncompliance with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 165, 173 (2002) (The conditions on ratification
"merely displace[] the primary implementation burden from the national gov-
ernment to each of the states ... encourag[ing] unique enforcement solutions tai-
lored to each state's specific situation.").
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tical matter, achieve compliance with the treaty provisions to which it is party,"
and cannot meet its obligations under international law.54 Thus one might
argue that states are currently required under federal law to take independent
action to implement these instruments." Of course, the presence of the ratifica-
tion RUDs may eliminate the possibility that these treaties will be enforced
against noncompliant states and cities. 6 But given the commitment the incor-
porationists have demonstrated to the goals of human rights treaties, it is
curious that they have not relied on the federalism understanding as a mandate,
especially given the possibility that actions taken pursuant to the federalism
clause should be protected from preemption."
Despite their stronger claim to authority and the mandate they create for
state participation, there is little evidence that the ratified human rights treaties
are prompting explicit state and local implementation initiatives, even among
54. Davis, The Spirit of Our Times, supra note 6, at 362.
55. Again, the decision in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2oo8), may have cast some
doubt on the domestic status of these treaties. See infra note ioo. However, this
development is recent enough that it cannot explain the historical lack of
engagement.
56. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. The RUDs send a strong message
that whatever role the states might have in treaty implementation, there is neither
an actual expectation that they will participate, nor any threat of sanction if they
fail to do so.
57. By contrast, actions taken to implement the unratified treaties could be subject to
challenges on preemption grounds. See Resnik, supra note 5, at 77-78; see also Gay-
lynn Burroughs, More Than an Incidental Effect on Foreign Affairs: Implementation
of Human Rights by State and Local Governments, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 411, 418 (2006) (" [Tihe CEDAW ordinance could be seen as an unconsti-
tutional exercise of local power that tramples upon the United States' prerogative
to reject a particular treaty and to speak with one voice.") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). How the preemption doctrines would be applied to
actions taken pursuant to the federalism understandings is complicated. Essential-
ly, the federal government would have to make the argument that despite the his-
toric (and potentially constitutionally mandated) delegation of a particular area of
regulation to the states, and despite the federalism understanding included at rati-
fication that preserves state control over these areas, federal primacy in the area of
international law requires that independent state initiatives in this area be negated
pursuant to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. See id. The states then would be
required to demonstrate that the regulation of their relationship with their own
population had "more than some incidental or indirect effect" on the foreign af-
fairs of the United States. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1968). The
complexity of this articulation of the argument alone demonstrates the problems
of divvying up jurisdictional authority over these instruments. My point, howev-
er, is that the incorporationist states and localities have been the most proactive in
terms of pushing the boundaries of federal exclusivity on issues of international
law and foreign affairs, and yet, here, in an area in which they apparently have de-
legated authority, they have for the most part declined to act.
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the incorporationists. Identifying these programs is somewhat challenging be-
cause the federal government has historically done little tracking of these activi-
ties. The 2008 report of the United States Human Rights Network's CERD
Working Group on Local Implementation and Treaty Obligations noted that
the United States has authorized no federal or state body to promote and moni-
tor treaty implementation, and has done nothing to raise awareness of CERD at
the state or local level, despite the significant role that the states must play in
implementing the treaty's guarantees.'" Similarly, "the United States' 20o6 Re-
port on its compliance with ICCPR provided 'only limited information ... on
the implementation of the Covenant at the state level."' 9 This trend is chang-
ing, however. The most recent U.S. compliance report, which was submitted to
the CERD committee in 2007, includes sections dealing specifically with state
activities and programs.o In May 2olo, Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser to
the Department of State, sent a letter to state and local human rights commis-
sions regarding the reports due in 2010 and 2011 on the implementation of U.S.
human rights obligations under ICCPR, CERD, and CAT." In this letter, Koh
explains the significant role of state and local governments in ensuring com-
pliance with the country's international commitments." He also solicits the as-
sistance of these entities in collecting and compiling information related to
subnational management of the wide variety of issues covered by these trea-
ties.'3
58. Risa E. Kaufman, Human Rights in the United States: Reclaiming the History and
Ensuring the Future, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149, 159 (2008) (reviewing
BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME (Cynthia Soohoo, Catherine Albisa & Martha F.
Davis eds., 2007)) (citing U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK'S CERD WORKING
GROUPS ON LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION AND TREATY OBLIGATIONS, A REPORT TO
THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINA-
TION ON U.S. CERD OBLIGATIONS AND DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION (2008),
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/usa/USHRN7
.doc).
59. Id. at 165-66 (quoting U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Sub-
mitted by State Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, 5 4, U.N. Doc.
CCPRIC/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2o6)).
60. See, e.g., PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE U.N.
COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CONCERNING THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION 27 (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/83517.pdf.
61. See Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser for the Dep't of State,
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By rough measures, subnational engagement in this area is still relatively
minimal. A 2009 survey of state-level human rights and civil rights commissions
revealed that none includes even a reference to these ratified treaties in their
mission statements.64 Other scholars have collected isolated examples of state
and local attempts to promote CERD that parallel the initiatives in support of
ratification, but these are few and far between.6 5 And, perhaps more significant-
ly, even these initiatives generally appear to treat the ratified and unratified trea-
ties identically for purposes of domestic implementation. That is, there is no
express distinction made based on their legal status."
One notable exception is the California legislature's ongoing efforts to use
CERD to undo the effects of Proposition 209, which amended the California
Constitution to prohibit any public use of racial, ethnic, or gender preferences
to remedy past discrimination. 7 In 2003, the legislature adopted a bill defining
a provision in the state constitution in accordance with CERD in order to per-
64. See Kalb, Dynamic Federalism, supra note 6, at 1o62 n.193 (2010). This study, rely-
ing as it does on reviewing the websites of state civil and human rights commis-
sions, does not capture activity at a substate level. The Human Rights Institute at
Columbia Law School reports on several initiatives occurring at the municipal
level, but even these projects tend to focus on the unratified treaties and on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS INST.,
supra note 19.
65. See Davis, supra note 1, at 134-40; Lesley Wexler, The Promise and Limits of Local
Human Rights Internationalism, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 599, 632 (2010). In 1986,
Burlington, Iowa, adopted some provisions of CERD in Human Rights Ordinance
2807. Burlington, Iowa, Ordinance 2807 (Sept. 2, 1986), reprinted in THOMAS M.
FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
LAw: CASES, MATERIALS AND SIMULATIONS 790 (2d ed. 1993). In 2000, San Fran-
cisco's CEDAW ordinance was amended to include the principles of CERD. See
Davis, supra note 1, at 137. New York City's proposed CEDAW legislation would
also implement CERD, but the ordinance has not yet been adopted. See Reintro-
duction of the Human Rights GOAL at New York City Council, N.Y.C. HUMAN
RIGHTS INITIATIVE (June 29, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://www.nychri.org/
ReintroductionoftheHumanRightsGOAL.htm (announcing the reintroduction of
the Human Rights GOAL bill).
66. For example, the New York City Human Rights Initiative proposes
"ground-breaking legislation that draws from broad human rights principles of
non-discrimination, participation, accountability, and transparency, as well as
from two key international treaties addressing gender and race discrimination-
CEDAW ... and CERD...." N.Y.C. HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, http://www
.nychri.org/ (last visited June 14, 2on). The Initiative emphasizes the role of these
international instruments in helping frame and promote a local human rights
agenda but says nothing about the importance of fulfilling the United States'
binding legal commitments. Moreover, the Initiative does not distinguish between
CERD, which has been ratified, and CEDAW, which has not.
67. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
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mit some forms of preferential treatment based on race.68 This attempt prompt-
ed numerous legal challenges, and in C&C Construction v. Sacramento Munici-
pal Utility District,6 9 a California appeals court determined that the legislature
had unconstitutionally infringed on the power of the courts to interpret the
constitution.70 In the wake of that decision, Professor J. Owens Smith, who was
responsible for the research and drafting of the legislation, said that the state
court failed to accord the appropriate weight to the ratified treaty: "The state
constitution should be subordinate to the human rights treaty .... The CERD
definition, the Supreme Law of the Land, should have trumped state law."" In
other words, the California courts relied incorrectly on a "soft law" view of the
treaty's norms as providing guidance to the legislature (similar to the way that
an unratified treaty could be used), rather than as a binding source of authority.
Advocates raised this argument in a later case. In Coral Construction v. City
of San Francisco, appellants challenged San Francisco's Minority/Women/Local
Business Utilization Ordinance, which required race- and gender-conscious
remedies to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination in the awarding of city
contracts.7 ' The court noted that the Supreme Court of California (acting in its
role as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional meaning) had previously defined
68. CERD specifically permits the use of "special measures taken for the sole purpose
of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals
requiring such protection," which may conflict with the limitations that the U.S.
Supreme Court has placed on the use of affirmative action programs. CERD,
supra note 1o, at 216.
69. 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
70. The Court explained that "Assembly Bill No. 703 amounted to an attempt by the
Legislature and the Governor to amend the California Constitution without com-
plying with the procedures for amendment. This attempt was manifestly beyond
their constitutional authority." Id. at 726. The California Supreme Court declined
to review the case. The relationship between CERD and the provision in question,
and the state's obligations with respect to CERD, were raised for the first time on
appeal and were thus summarily dismissed. Id. The court did note, however, that
CERD permits "special measures" only to ensure certain racial or ethnic groups or
individuals "equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental free-
doms . . . ." Id. at 727 (citing CERD, supra note io, at art. 1(4)). The court held that
the decision to ban affirmative action programs by referendum meant that the
California citizenry had determined that "special measures are not only unneces-
sary to ensure human rights and fundamental freedoms in California, but inimic-
al to those principles." Id. Therefore, the court concluded that the special meas-
ures authorized by CERD "are not permitted in California, even under the
Convention." Id.
71. Davis, supra note 1, at 142-43 (citing Davis's discussion with J. Owens Smith on
June 26, 2006).
72. 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 781, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
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the term "discriminate" according to its ordinary dictionary definition.73 The
appellate court then rejected the notion that the federal authority granted by the
federalism reservation gave the state some "super-legislative" power to change
the California Constitution without following the proper procedures for
amendment.7 4 The court then considered whether CERD actually trumped the
California constitutional prohibition on the use of racial and gender preferences
and ultimately determined that it did not." It noted that at the time of ratifica-
tion, the United States expressed its position that CERD did not require the use
of preferences to remedy past racial discrimination.76 Despite the conflict this
limitation posed to the position of the CERD Committee responsible for the
treaty's interpretation,77 the court deferred to the State Department's permissive
approach. It concluded, therefore, that because the state constitutional provi-
sion could be reconciled with CERD, it was not preempted.7'
Although this case represented a disappointment for human rights advo-
cates, the use of CERD and the resulting dialogue it created between and among
the branches of the state government is demonstrative of the deep engagement
by state actors that the federalism reservation enables and even necessitates.
This example is, nonetheless, anomalous. Despite the breadth of these treaties'
protections, there is little subnational engagement with them, nor much indica-
tion that the incorporationists feel empowered or obligated to apply them as
law. Somewhat surprisingly then, it appears that the incorporationist states and
localities are more engaged with unratified than ratified treaties.
B. Explaining the Paradox
The general failure of states and localities to implement the ratified human
rights treaties may be explained in multiple ways; however, the obvious expla-
nations fail to address the contradictory behavior of the incorporationists. For
example, the absence of state-level implementation activity could simply reflect
political resistance by subnational actors to the imposition of international hu-
man rights norms. In this view, the federalism understanding is simply a
"bait-and-switch" move by the states and the federal government to avoid mak-





77. The CERD Committee is the monitoring body for CERD. Among its other re-
sponsibilities, the Committee reviews the submissions of the State Parties docu-
menting the legislative, judicial, administrative, and other efforts taken to effec-
tuate the Convention, and it provides suggestions and general recommendations
for compliance. See CERD, supra note lo, at 224-26.
78. Coral Construction, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 792.
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ing any revisions to domestic law to comply with treaty obligations. 9 This ex-
planation probably accounts for the behavior of many states and localities, giv-
en the negative attention that the domestic incorporation of international law
has received in recent years.80 Certain elements of the Republican Party have
recently expressed broad opposition to the United States' participation in inter-
national legal regimes,"* and some states are considering taking, or have taken,
steps to try to block the consideration of international or comparative law in
their courts. For example, Oklahoma voters recently decisively adopted a con-
stitutional amendment" to ban consideration of foreign, international, or Sha-
ria law in judicial decision making.8 3 Although the adoption of the amendment
was promptly enjoined by a federal court on First Amendment grounds,84 nu-
79. Certainly, this reading of the situation would receive some support from the pres-
ence of the ratification RUDs that purport to limit these treaties' domestic effect
and enforceability. See Henkin, supra note 12, at 342.
80. Even nondispositive references to comparative and international law have
prompted legislative proposals forbidding any reference to international law in
U.S. constitutional interpretation and providing for the impeachment of any
judge who violates this rule. See, e.g., Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, S.
2082, io8th Cong. §§ 201, 302 (2004).
81. See, e.g., TEx. REPUBLICAN PARTY, 2010 STATE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM
22-23 (2010), available at https://www.1888932-2946.ws/TexasGOP/E-Content
Strategy/userfiles/2010 RPTPLATFORM.pdf (advocating, among other things,
withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations, rejection of the Law of
the Sea Treaty, and rescission of "any existing treaties that compromise the Unit-
ed States Constitution"); Mission and Platform, ME. REPUBLICAN PARTY,
http://www.mainegop.com/about-2/mission-and-platform (last visited Oct. 7,
2011) (The Maine Republican Party "[o]ppose[s] any and all treaties with the UN
or any other organization or country which surrenders US sovereignty," specifi-
cally including the CRC and the Law of the Sea Treaty).
82. According to press reports, the ballot initiative was passed with more than seventy
percent support. See Ariane de Vogue, Federal Judge Bars Oklahoma Ballot Initia-
tive on Sharia Law, ABC NEWS, Nov. 29, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/federal-judge-bars-implementation-ballot-initiative-sharia-law/story?id
=12269179.
83. See Martha F. Davis & Johanna Kalb, Oklahoma and Beyond: Understanding the
Wave of State Anti-Transnational Law Initiatives, 87 IND. L.J. SUPPLEMENT 1 (2011),
http://ilj.law.indiana.edu/articles/87/87_daviskalb.pdf; see also Donna Leinwand,
More States Enter Debate on Sharia Law, USA TODAY (Dec. 9, 2010),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2o1o-12-o9-shariabano9_STN.htm.
84. See James C. McKinley, Judge Blocks Oklahoma's Ban on Using Shariah Law in
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merous other states considered similar initiatives in their most recent legislative
sessions."*
Nonetheless, it seems clear that resistance to international human rights
law does not account for the behavior of the incorporationists, given the actions
they have already taken to encourage national acceptance of treaties that have
not been ratified. Additionally, outside the treaty context, a number of states
have raised their voices on a variety of different human rights issues, including,
most famously, Massachusetts's passage of legislation to prohibit the purchase
of goods from Burma,86 California's attempt to provide rights of recovery to
Holocaust victims,7 and Illinois's adoption of divestment provisions preventing
the state treasurer and state pension funds from investing in the Sudanese
government or its business partners." Thus, it seems obvious that the incorpo-
rationists are not consistently averse to participating in human rights regimes or
expressing a voice on rights-related issues of foreign affairs.
Another possible explanation for the lack of subnational engagement with
human rights treaties is a general lack of local expertise or interest in interna-
tional law. Again, this factor may account for the behavior of some subset of
subnational actors with respect to these treaties; however, other evidence
suggests that a broad subset of the states is very active in implementing a variety
of other kinds of treaty law. Professor Julian Ku has documented several exam-
ples of state involvement in treaty implementation in the private law context.9
For example, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction was implemented through federal legislation, but a group of states
have adopted the Uniform Child Custody and Enforcement Act "so that state
law can enforce an order for the return of the child without reference to federal
law."9 o Similarly, "most states have enacted legislation to ensure implementa-
tion [of the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization for Foreign
Public Documents] either through adoption of the Uniform Law on Notarial
85. Judith Resnik, Comparative (In)Equalities: CEDAW, the Jurisdiction of Gender,
and the Heterogeneity of Transnational Law Production 7-8 (Oct. 2, 2011) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (listing initiatives); see also Leinwand,
supra note 83.
86. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding the legis-
lation preempted by federal law and therefore unconstitutional).
87. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (finding the state act
preempted by national foreign policy).
88. Act To End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan, 15 111. Comp. Stat. 520/22.5
(2005), available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?name
=094-0079.
89. Julian G. Ku, The Crucial Role of the States and Private International Law Treaties:
A Model for Accommodating Globalization, 73 Mo. L. REV. 1o63, 1065 (20o8).
go. Id.
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Acts or separate legislation."9 ' Because many of these treaties squarely overlap
with domestic state law, state legislatures have often taken the lead role in im-
plementing them to ensure that their citizens benefit from the rights that the
laws afford.92 It appears, therefore, that at least some state legislators are quite
comfortable domesticating certain kinds of treaty law.
Thus, to characterize the states' position as one of rejection (either of inter-
national law generally or of human rights law particularly) fails to acknowledge
not only an arguably deep base of knowledge and expertise at the state level, but
also the genuine commitment of some states and cities to the project of "bring-
ing human rights home."93 The states are not a uniform group, and cities offer a
far more numerous and consequently even more diverse set of perspectives and
capabilities. Thus, though these two explanations likely account for the lack of
activity in some or even most states, they fail to explain the absence of engage-
ment by the incorporationists. This group is likely to be at the forefront of the
movement to implement the ratified human rights treaties, and the challenges
these actors face are worth understanding. Additionally, their successful en-
gagement with treaties might reveal strategies for overcoming the barriers faced
by other subnational entities.
What then accounts for the incorporationists' behavior? One possibility is
that the paradox could be explained by politics, although in a more complex
rubric than the simple story of state resistance.94 As Professor Judith Resnik has
noted, American "sovereignists" who decry the application of international
human rights law domestically "are particularly focused on issues often grouped
under the rubric of 'the culture wars'-a phrase usually referring to clashes
about gender and sex, lifestyles and families, race, crime, and punishment."95
Thus, some of the structural resistance to implementing international human
rights law is a guise for political opposition to the normative outcomes these
instruments may be perceived to require.96 Because these treaties have become
91. Id.
92. See infra Subsection II.B.2 (discussion of the Wills Convention).
93. Maria Foscarinis, Advocating for the Human Right to Housing: Notes from the Unit-
ed States, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 447, 453 (2oo6) ("[I]n June 2004, the
Ford Foundation organized a day-long conference called 'Bringing Human Rights
Home,' highlighting the domestic use of human rights strategies and encouraging
funders to support such efforts."). This slogan now characterizes a discourse and
strategy used by domestic advocates.
94. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
95. Resnik, supra note 18, at 1574 (citing THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH
KANSAS?: How CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA 5-7 (2004)).
96. See Melish, supra note 5, at 425 ("[A]ssertions are... made that adhesion to
currently unratified treaties, like the CRC and CEDAW, will require immediate
mandatory legalization of same-sex marriage, provision of abortion and contra-
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contested sites in these ongoing domestic disputes, subnational resolutions of
support may be a way of expressing a position in these national disputes
through the lens of a treaty commitment. In other words, the battle over treaty
acceptance is just another front in the war over federal standards-the fact that
the mechanism is international law is incidental to the actual purpose.97
An alternative (or additional) angle to the political account is that the
incorporationist states and cities are engaged in what economists call "cheap
talk," which can be cynically defined as "frisson-inducing dissent that does not
make itself too inconvenient in practice for the current arrangement of interests
and ideas."9' As the San Francisco CEDAW program illustrates, there is a real
financial and administrative burden that comes with implementation. Resolu-
tions of acknowledgement allow cities and states to take credit for forwarding
human rights values without incurring any of these costs.99
A third possibility is that subnational entities do not recognize the space
that the treaty RUDs create for their consideration of these treaties. To date, the
federal government's position as to the states' obligations under these treaties is
ambiguous at best. The ratification RUDs purport to preserve a significant role
for the states while simultaneously disavowing any obligation on their part to
ception on demand, decriminalization of prostitution, the turning over of
child-rearing to the state, and other measures that could not currently be achieved
through national-level democratic processes alone.").
97. This explanation receives some support from the fact that issue advocacy organi-
zations have played a key role in mobilizing support for CEDAW and CRC ratifi-
cation initiatives. Both campaigns involve partnerships between organizations fo-
cused on international human rights with those focused on particular area
initiatives. In the San Francisco case, the CEDAW implementation movement was
led by the Women's Institute for Leadership Development, known as WILD for
Human Rights, working in collaboration with Amnesty International and the San
Francisco Women's Foundation. CRC is promoted by a number of national and
local organizations, including Amnesty International, the Child Welfare League of
America, the Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Center for Human Rights at
Northwestern Law School, and a national volunteer organization called the Cam-
paign for U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
98. Jedidiah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and
Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1190 n.225 (2010). Thanks to David Fontana for this
insight.
99. This example of "cheap talk" may incorrectly suggest that the simple expression of
these norms has no value or impact. To the contrary, norms scholar Cristina
Bicchieri has argued that "[t]he very act of promising, 'cheap talk' of no conse-
quence, might be enough to induce many of us to behave contrary to self-interest.
A social norm has been activated, and, under the right circumstances, we are pre-
pared to follow it." CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE
NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL NORMS 175 (2006). Andrew Woods has argued
that human rights advocates should focus more on the power of social influence
as a way of increasing respect for human rights. See generally Andrew K. Woods, A
Behavioral Approach to Human Rights, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 51 (2010).
93
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
take any action, as well as any threat of judicial enforcement. Nonetheless, as
previously explained, the federalism reservation creates a possible mandate for
state and local action, even if not an enforceable directive. This view may, how-
ever, be contradicted by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Medellin v.
Texas, which includes language suggesting that the ratified human rights trea-
ties are not even domestic law until implemented through federal legislation.'o
The Court's holding in Medellin has not affected the view of the State De-
partment, which continues to take the position that "the United States is bound
under international law to implement all of its obligations under these trea-
ties."o' It recently notified state governors that "implementation of [the ratified
human rights treaties] may be carried out by officials at all levels of govern-
ment""o2 and asked them to distribute information regarding these treaties to
loo. The Court stated: "What we mean by 'self-executing' is that the treaty has auto-
matic domestic effect... upon ratification. Conversely, a 'non-self-executing'
treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law."
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008); see also id. at 504 ("This Court has
long recognized the distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as
domestic law, and those that-while they constitute international law commit-
ments--do not by themselves function as binding federal law."). Given the con-
flict that this reasoning would present with the plain language of the Supremacy
Clause, most of the subsequent scholarly commentary has assumed that Medellin
must be read more narrowly. Professor Curtis Bradley, for example, acknowledges
that the Court's statements could be viewed as stating that treaties "have no do-
mestic law status at all," but contends that the decision should be interpreted to
mean only that non-self-executing treaties are not judicially enforceable. Curtis
Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT'L L.
540, 541, 548-50 (2008); see also Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties as the Law of the
Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARv. L.
REV. 599, 649 (20o8) ("At several points, the Court said that the
non-self-executing treaties were not 'enforceable' domestic law. Only this narrow-
er understanding of Medellin avoids a direct conflict with the constitutional
text."). Nonetheless, until the Supreme Court is presented with an opportunity to
clarify its meaning, the domestic status of these treaties is uncertain.
Thus far, there has been little discussion of the implications of this decision
for U.S. federalism in human rights treaty implementation. The purpose of the
federalism understanding would be unclear if these treaties (which are explicitly
non-self-executing because of the RUDs with which they were ratified) are not
even domestic law. The federal government could then make the treaty applicable
to the states only through federal legislation requiring state compliance. However,
in so doing, the federal government would presumably cross the boundaries of fe-
deralism that the understanding was designed to protect. Therefore, to adopt this
view of self-execution would seemingly render the federalism understanding
meaningless.
loi. Memorandum from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser to the Dep't of State, to
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the responsible subnational actors. But confusingly, the State Department
simultaneously represents that the United States has already implemented these
treaties because its law at the time of ratification was sufficient to satisfy the
treaty guarantees."o3 Thus, as a result of these mixed messages, the incorpora-
tionists may view these treaties as implemented, or they may be unaware of the
potential mandate that is created by the federalism understanding-a mandate
for additional consideration of the rights that the treaties seek to protect beyond
or in addition to what domestic law already requires.
Without minimizing the possible significance of these explanations, I want
to focus here on an alternative. My suggestion is that even when the incorpora-
tionists are participating in implementing treaties (in human rights and in other
areas), they are generally doing so from within the constraints of a dualist un-
derstanding of federalism. That is, they act when there are clearly delineated
areas of state and federal authority within the implementation project. As I will
explain, the human rights treaties, both ratified and unratified, are not condu-
cive to this kind of approach because of the broad and cross-cutting nature of
the principles that they endorse. This characteristic makes divvying up the im-
plementation tasks vertically (as between the different levels of government)
and horizontally (between different actors at the same level) extremely chal-
lenging. It also makes the actual goals of implementation difficult to define. The
incongruence between the structure of these treaties and a dualist approach is, I
contend, impeding substantive implementation activities at the state and local
level.
If I am correct, this thesis resolves the apparent paradox because the incor-
porationists' behavior toward the ratified and the unratified treaties becomes
consistent. Human rights treaties are viewed as a federal responsibility, and
therefore states and localities generally focus their efforts on encouraging feder-
al adoption of these standards. Moreover, this explanation dovetails with the
first three I offered. The dualist perspective may be adopted purposefully by the
"cheap talk" incorporationists, who can then exploit the uncertainty around
implementation responsibilities by focusing their efforts on advocating ratifica-
tion while leaving the burden of implementation on the federal government.
Alternatively, the dualist approach may operate more subtly, as cities and states
endorse international human rights treaties as a way of changing federal policy
without considering fully the possible benefits of their local adoption. Finally,
lack of awareness of what implementing these treaties actually entails and which
level of government is responsible may simply cause incorporationists to miss
103. Id. at 1-2 ("United States obligations under ICCPR, CERD, and the CRC Optional
Protocols are implemented under existing law; in other words, prior to becoming
a party to each of these treaties, the U.S. State Department, coordinating with
other relevant agencies, reviewed the treaties and relevant provisions of U.S. law
and determined that existing laws in the United States were sufficient to imple-
ment the treaty obligations, as understood or modified by reservations, under-
standings or declarations made by the United States at the time of ratification in
order to ensure congruence between treaty obligations and existing U.S. laws.").
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opportunities for engaging with these instruments. Moving beyond a dualist fo-
cus on divisions of responsibility could thus increase incorporationist participa-
tion in the treaty process.
II. DUALISM IN TREATY IMPLEMENTATION
I have argued that the failure of the incorporationists to engage fully with
the ratified human rights treaties can be explained in part by their dualist pers-
pective on the task of treaty implementation. In this Part, I begin to unpack this
somewhat counterintuitive hypothesis by providing another point of compari-
son through which to understand the implementation challenges of the ratified
human rights treaties. First, I will present the range of possible cooperative fe-
deralist relationships. Next, I reexamine three of the examples of feder-
al-subnational collaborations in regulating the nation's foreign affairs that have
been regularly raised in the academic literature, and I argue that the relatively
successful domestication of these instruments may be attributed to the fact that,
by contrast to the human rights treaties, they are conducive to a dualist model
of implementation.
A. Rethinking Cooperative Federalism
Before turning to my case studies, some definitional clarity is necessary. At
first blush, the contention that even the incorporationists are bringing a dualist
perspective to international treaty law seems contradictory. In a traditional
dualist model, under which federal and state authorities have clearly defined
and distinct areas of authority that are differentiated both by territory and sub-
ject matter,o4 "foreign affairs and international law. . . have been areas of par-
ticular insulation against subnational participation."' Thus, on one level, any
state or local participation in international lawmaking crosses traditional fede-
ralism boundaries. The literature in this area has generally characterized feder-
al-subnational interactions around international treaty law as falling into the
broad category of "cooperative" federalist relationships.
This binary framework, which sets dualist and cooperative relationships in
opposition, is no longer particularly helpful as a descriptive matter. Moving
away from a binary approach allows for a more precise characterization of dif-
ferent modes of national and subnational interaction-and, therefore, for a bet-
104. Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE
THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 33, 34 (William
W. Buzbee ed., 2009) ("The key postulates of dual federalism are that the states
and the federal government exercise exclusive control over nonoverlapping re-
gions of authority, that these realms of exclusive control are defined by subject
matter, and that the federal courts play an important and distinctive role in
guarding the boundaries of state and federal terrain.").
105. Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Les-
sons from Coordination, 73 Mo. L. REV. 1185, 1192 (20o8).
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ter understanding of how different kinds of regulatory relationships may be
employed to solve different problems. Instead of conceiving of federalist rela-
tionships as a binary, therefore, assume that "dualism" is one end point of a
spectrum of cooperative relationships. "Pure" dualism rejects entirely the pos-
sibility of concurrent jurisdiction over different subject matter areas: State and
federal governments have designated areas of authority in which they operate,
and the role of the courts is simply to protect these clear jurisdictional bounda-
ries from incursion from both directions.
At the other end of the spectrum is dualism's converse: "dynamic federal-
ism.""o' Dynamic federalism describes a relationship that is purposefully struc-
tured to capture the benefits of jurisdictional overlap: plurality, dialogue, and
redundancy.o 7  Plurality refers to the possibility federalism creates
for "a variety of different responses[, which] ... encourag[es] policy experi-
mentation."os It captures the notion of states as laboratories and recognizes the
possibility that the appropriate regulatory response may vary based on local
conditions. The experience of plurality is enhanced by the possibility of dialo-
gue between institutional actors, which allows for further innovation based on
1o6. The literature on dynamic federalism emerged as a response to the Rehnquist
Court's jurisprudential movement to redraw and enforce the boundaries on fed-
eral and state power. While the Court was engaged in this project of line drawing,
"[tlhe most significant developments in federalism were occurring outside of the
courts, as the states and the national government worked through various cooper-
ative and competitive arrangements." Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualist Federal-
ism to Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 (2006). This disconnect between
the Rehnquist Court's dualist model of federalism and the reality on the ground
has led to a body of scholarship that attempts to more accurately describe the
state-federal relationship by accounting for the many areas of shared state-federal
jurisdiction and offers constructive ways of mediating that overlap. These models,
referred to as "adaptive," "dialogic," "polyphonic," and "interactive" federalism,
attempt to describe ways in which the federal government and subnational gov-
ernments manage their areas of concurrent authority. See David E. Adelman &
Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmen-
tal Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); Powell, supra note 16, at
250; Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal
Courts, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1409 (1999); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of
Interactive Federalism, 91 IOwA L. REV. 243 (2005). However, these models also
attempt to go beyond the descriptive, working to identify and maximize the per-
ceived benefits that result from jurisdictional redundancy. I use Professor Kirsten
Engel's term "dynamic" as a way to broadly capture the underlying principles of
this set of models. See Kirsten Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federal-
ism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176-77 (20o6) (adopting the term
"dynamic" to describe this body of work in which "federal and state governments
function as alternative centers of power and any matter is presumptively within
the authority of both the federal and state governments").
107. Schapiro, supra note 104, at 43.
1o8. Id.
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the exchange of experiences. Finally, "[rlegulatory overlap facilitates redundan-
cy as well. If one set of regulators fails to address the problem, another set pro-
vides an alternative avenue for relief."'09
In order to reap the benefits of plurality, dialogue, and redundancy, local,
state, and federal governments must engage repeatedly through interactions
over concurrent areas of authority. To maximize the values of dynamism, there-
fore, partnerships must be structured to encourage ongoing, simultaneous fed-
eral-subnational activity in overlapping areas of jurisdiction."o This kind of
framework permits the development of a diverse range of approaches to differ-
ent regulatory problems, which can then be shared and replicated, rejected, or
improved upon. This process is purposefully advanced through proactive
efforts to collect and publicize both best practices and failures. Concurrent
jurisdiction is actively retained to permit the coexistence of alternative solutions
from different authorities."'
These features of dynamism are present to greater or lesser degrees in all
cooperative federalist interactions, and measuring their presence or absence
allows for the characterization of a partnership as either more dualist or more
dynamic along the spectrum of cooperative relationships. A related observation
is that not all of these characteristics may be necessary or productive in every
cooperative relationship. Rather, their significance will depend on the nature of
the obligation in question, as well as the nature of the pressure the federal gov-
ernment is authorized or willing to apply to urge state participation in national
goals. For example, a more dualist cooperative model may be adequate if the
solution to a particular regulatory problem falls more clearly within the realm
of existing state or federal regulation and the other sovereign is content to play a
supporting role. By contrast, a more dynamic cooperative relationship may be
necessary when implementation cannot be resolved simply by divvying up tasks
along clear lines of territorial authority and where the federal government is
unwilling to act, or incapable of acting, coercively.
109. Id. at 44.
n1o. Id. ("The optimal regulatory regime develops and changes over time, with con-
stant interaction from a variety of forces, including information generated by oth-
er regulators.").
Inl. The notion that the framework should actively promote ongoing interactions as a
normative good may not be captured within most conceptions of dynamic fede-
ralism. In introducing their idea of "adaptive" federalism, Professors David
Adelman and Kirsten Engel contend that dynamic federalism empowers states to
compete with the federal government, with policy conflicts resolved "on the me-
rits." Adelman & Engel, supra note lo6, at 1830. Their adaptive federalism, as I un-
derstand it, focuses more on protecting the process by "emphasiz[ingl the critical
role that a multijurisdictional framework of government plays in allowing policy
diversification and optimization to coexist." Id.
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Dynamism imposes costs in uncertainty, inefficiency, and inconsistency.n2
These must be weighed against its potential benefits in particular circumstances.
In any event, selecting the appropriate model of federalist engagement requires
a more detailed understanding of the desired goals in relation to the range of
possible modes of interaction. In the next Section, I rely on case studies to ilu-
strate the utility of this approach in the realm of international law and foreign
affairs.
B. The Spectrum of Cooperative Federalism Relationships: Case Studies
With this "spectrum" framework of cooperative federalism in place, I turn
now to consider some of the most regularly cited"' examples of feder-
al-subnational cooperation in realizing the nation's international commitments
outside the human rights context. While all of these cases could be (and in some
instances, have been)114 described as "dynamic" in the existing literature, my
goal here is to refine this categorization by looking more closely at where specif-
ically each of these interactions fits along the spectrum from dualism to dynam-
ism. Generally, I argue that the relative success of these partnerships results
from the fact that, by contrast to the human rights treaties, their goals are
conducive to a more dualist model of federal-state cooperation.
112. See Ahdieh, supra note 105, at 1242-44. Professor Robert Ahdieh explains that the
presence of multiple authorities with regulatory control over a question of law or
fact can create uncertainty. He gives the example of foreign states' unwillingness
to extradite criminal suspects to the United States because of uncertainties as to
which jurisdiction could offer a binding commitment to remove the death penalty
as an option. Id. at 1242-43. Further, the redundancies of dynamism may create
inefficiencies in achieving some substantive goals. Id. at 1243-44. Finally, dynam-
ism may "dictate some trade-off with universalistic or other substantive commit-
ments as to ends" given "the embrace of multiple voices." Id. at 1243. For the last
reason, Ahdieh suggests that dynamism may be inappropriate in the human rights
context, given its commitment to universalism. Id. at 1237.
113. See generally Ahdieh, supra note 105 (discussing the federalist relationships embo-
died in the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act (SADA)); Amelia H. Boss,
The Future of the Uniform Commercial Code Process in an Increasingly Internation-
al World, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 349 (2007) (Wills Convention); Kalb, Dynamic Federal-
ism, supra note 6, at 1025 (2010) (Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(VCCR)); Julian Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control
Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457 (2004) (VCCR and Wills
Convention); Resnik, supra note 15, at 1144-45 (SADA).
114. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 16, at 274 (describing the interactions around the
VCCR as dialogic).
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1. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), to which the
United States is a party, mandates that a foreign national within a signatory
state be advised of his right to notify his consulate of his arrest.115 Because the
notification guarantee is triggered by an arrest, compliance in the United States
requires the participation of a variety of national and subnational entities.
Implementation of the Convention thus requires some level of state engage-
ment with the federal commitment.
Despite the fact that the vast majority of arrests are conducted by state and
local law enforcement officials, no guidance was provided at the subnational
level as to the new requirements at the time of ratification. As a result, in the
early years after ratification, " [s]tate and local police forces . .. operated in bliss-
ful ignorance of the requirement, with the result that noncompliance was wide-
spread.""' Beginning in the early 1990s,n1 this ongoing failure to comply with
the VCCR began to be challenged in state, federal, and international courts, as
other parties to the Convention protested the imposition of the death penalty
on those of their citizens who had failed to exercise their right to consular noti-
fication while in U.S. custody. The federal government then launched a
large-scale educational campaign intended to inform state and local officials of
their obligations under Article 36."' According to the State Department, since
1998, it has conducted approximately 450 training sessions in forty states and
territories. Additionally, the Department has: distributed over one million piec-
es of instructional material, "including manuals, pocket reference cards, train-
ing videos, and CD-ROMs;" "published several articles on consular notifica-
tion" for "the membership magazines of the American Correctional Association
and the American Jail Association;" and provided information for articles pub-
lished in other law enforcement publications."9 The State Department also pro-
115. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR].
116. Margaret McGuinness, Medellin, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration of
International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 796 (2oo6) (citing S.
Adele Shank & John Quigley, Foreigners on Texas's Death Row and the Right of
Access to Counsel, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 719, 748 (1995)).
117. Professor Margaret McGuinness has identified a Canadian national named Joseph
Stanley Faulder as the first defendant in this wave of litigation. Id. at 800. She
notes, however, that the first case brought pursuant to Article 36 of the VCCR was
a challenge to a deportation order in the late 1970s. Id. at 799-800 (citing United
States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979)).
n8. See id. at 824.
119. Outreach by the State Department: State Department Activities To Advance Consu-
lar Notification and Access Awareness and Compliance, TRAVEL.STATE.Gov,
http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_2244.html (last visited Feb. 1o, 2011).
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vides a model standard operating procedure through its website, which is in-
tended for law enforcement agencies to use as a template.12 0
The impact of all of these activities is difficult to measure comprehensively;
however, the effort appears to have decreased ignorance and noncompliance. As
of this writing, only two states, California and Oregon,' have formally
amended their penal codes to include the requirements of Article 36, but "many
local police departments [have] incorporate[d] instructions on consular notifi-
cation into their internal manuals." 2 2 Furthermore, "a written directive govern-
ing procedures for assuring compliance with consular notification and access
requirements is now required for accreditation by the Commission on Accredi-
tation for Law Enforcement Agencies," which will likely lead to even more
widespread adoption of the requirements.'2 3 The State Department's education-
al efforts have been successful enough that Dean Janet Koven Levit has argued
that by the time the Court issued its decision in Medellin, effectively ending the
possibility of a judicial remedy for Article 36 violations, the "core goal of Vienna
Convention litigation, compliance, had been met."12 4
120. Part Six: Consular Notification and Access Model Standard Operating Procedure,
TRAVEL.STATE.Gov, http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular-oo2.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2011).
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c(a)-(d) (West 1999) (requiring consular notification for
"known or suspected foreign national[s]" for any arrest or detention lasting long-
er than two hours); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.642(2) (2003) (requiring the Board on
Public Safety Standards and Training to ensure that all peace officers are trained
to provide consular notification). Florida also has a statute requiring consular no-
tification that predates the ratification of the VCCR. FLA. STAT. § 901.26 (1965)
(amended 2001). It was amended in 2001 to state that "[flailure to provide consu-
lar notification under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations or other bi-
lateral consular conventions shall not be a defense in any criminal proceeding
against any foreign national and shall not be cause for the foreign national's dis-
charge from custody." FLA. STAT. § 901.26 (2001). Illinois is considering legislation
that would codify the right to consular notification by law enforcement officers
and by courts. The statute also provides that if a defendant does not receive the
right to consular notification before his or her first appearance in court, the court
must grant a continuance to permit contact with the consulate-and that if con-
sular notification is not provided for conviction and sentencing, the trial court
shall consider whether the defendant was prejudiced. S.B. 1906, 9 7th Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2on), available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/97/SB/
09700SBi906.htm.
122. Part Six: Consular Notification and Access Model Standard Operating Procedure,
supra note 120.
123. Id.
124. Janet Koven Levit, Does Medellin Matter?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 617, 630 (2008).
Dean Levit interviewed a variety of actors in the county of Tulsa, Oklahoma, as a
way of demonstrating how the "bottom up" story of the VCCR differs from the
"top down" account of Supreme Court and International Court of Justice deci-
sions. Id. This is not an entirely rosy picture, of course. Some states have also
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Where does the VCCR fit in a dynamic federalist typology? Clearly the im-
plementation of the Convention's right to consular notification is a cooperative
project, requiring participation at all levels of government for full implementa-
tion; however, a closer look suggests that characterizing the interaction between
different levels of government as dynamic would be somewhat misleading. The
obligations imposed by the VCCR were accepted by the federal government
without subnational consultation and are easily divisible along territorial boun-
daries (since they are triggered by the identity of the arresting authority). More-
over, the nature of the federal-subnational interactions around implementation
is not particularly interactive. The flow of information is primarily in one direc-
tion through the extensive informational campaign the federal government has
conducted to educate states and localities as to their role in the predetermined
implementation framework. Thus, viewing the possibilities of cooperative fede-
ralism as a spectrum would suggest that the VCCR implementation scheme be-
longs closer to the dualist than the dynamic end of the spectrum."'
2. The Convention on the Form of an International Will
The 1973 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) Convention on the Form of an International Will (Wills Conven-
tion) offers a different model with more of the elements associated with dynam-
ism. The Wills Convention specifies the proper form for an international will
and provides that, for its execution to be valid, an "authorized person" must
issue a certificate as to its propriety."' The Wills Convention permits each sig-
natory to designate the persons who will be "authorized" to execute interna-
tional wills within that jurisdiction. Every other signatory must then recognize
the effectiveness of certificates made by those authorized persons.12 7 Because the
subject matter of the Wills Convention touches an area of law typically con-
trolled by the states, "federalism concerns were raised early on in the history of
the Wills Convention.""' One commentator to the process suggested that the
Convention "sought not merely the resolution of international probate prob-
lems but [also] . . . the subversion of the traditional role of the American states
openly resisted the Convention's requirements, at least to the extent that the re-
quirements mandate a remedy for violations of the notification provision. See
Marc J. Kadish & Charles C. Olson, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: The Supreme Court, the Right to Consul,
and Remediation, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1185, 1232 (2006) (discussing the examples of
Oregon and Florida, supra note 121).
125. An important caveat to this point lies in the area of remedies. See infra note 149.
126. See Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-29, Oct. 26, 1973, available at http://www.unidroit.org/
english/conventions/1973wills/1973wills-e.htm.
127. Id.
128. Boss, supra note 113, at 380.
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in enforcing their own rules for testing the validity of testamentary instru-
ments."'2 9 In response to these concerns, the United States adopted a "two-tier
approach" whereby "federal legislation would cover recognition in the individ-
ual states of international wills executed abroad and state legislation would
cover recognition of wills executed in-state."'30
Despite its authority to do so, the federal government declined to imple-
ment the Convention by passing federal legislation.'' The federal government
instead chose to rely on the uniform laws system. The State Department Office
of Private International Law and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws collaborated in the development of the Uniform Interna-
tional Wills Act.132 By the close of 2010, at least twenty states and territories had
passed the Act,133 but Congress has yet to adopt the accompanying federal legis-
129. Jerome J. Curtis, Jr., The Convention on International Wills: A Reply to Kurt Na-
delmann, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 119, 120 (1975).
130. Boss, supra note 113, at 382 (citing 137 CONG. REC. S12,312 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991)).
131. The executive said as much in its message sent to Congress:
It would be undesirable ... to rely exclusively on federal legislation to
bring both aspects of the Convention-the execution of international
wills as well as their recognition-into force. Our testators and their
attorneys are not accustomed to consulting federal statutes for guidance
on the formalities for making wills; they should continue to be able to
place primary reliance on the laws of their States, rather than on federal
law, for this purpose. What is therefore to be recommended to the Con-
gress and the several State legislatures, is that the making of international
wills within the United States be governed by State legislation, with each
State free to decide whether it wishes to make it possible for testators to
execute wills in its jurisdiction in this new form.
Letter of Submittal from the Secretary of State to the President of the United
States, in President's Message to Congress Transmitting the Convention Provid-
ing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will, S. TREATY Doc. No.
99-29, at 6 (1986), available at 1973 U.S.T. LEXIS 321.
132. See Curtis R. Reitz, Globalization, International Legal Developments, and Uniform
State Laws, 51 Lov. L. REV. 301, 322 (2005).
133. ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.918 (2010); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6387 (West 2010); CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 15-11-1001 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 50a-8 (20o6); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, § 258 (2007); D.C. CODE § 18-708 (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-1001 (2010);
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/o.ol (West 2007); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS
§ 4-608 (West 2011); MIcH. COMP. LAWS §§ 700.2951-2959 (2002); MINN. STAT.
§ 524.2-1008 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-901 to -910 (2011); NEv. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 133A.olo (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 551-A:1 to -A:io (2006);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45.2-1001 to -ioio (20o); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.2-01
(2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 350 (2011); OR. REv. STAT. § 112.232 (2009); VA.
CoDE ANN. §§ 64-1-96.2 to -96.11 (2007); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 2-1001 to -1oo
(2010). Interestingly, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws' website reports only fifteen enactments nationally, while other sources
report double that number. Compare Unif. Law Comm'n, Legislative Fact Sheet-
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lation. Pending its enactment, the United States has not deposited the instru-
ment of ratification.3 4 Nonetheless, in the states and territories that have
adopted legislation, testators may "execute wills under the Convention, and for-
eign international wills are recognized in those states." 35
The Wills Convention experience evidences more of the elements of a
dynamic federalist relationship than the VCCR, in that the initial international
legal commitment was the product of a state-federal dialogue. Nonetheless, this
period of collaboration was limited to the Wills Convention, and it was focused
on how best to draw a bright line between the state and federal implementation
obligations. The proposed solution was standardized through the uniform laws
system ex ante, limiting the possibility for ongoing horizontal or vertical
engagement. Thus, although further along the spectrum than the VCCR, the
experience of the Wills Convention still retains elements of a dualist approach.
3. The Sudan Divestment Act
A final example of cooperative dualism involves the recent state-federal
interaction around divestment in Sudan. In response to ongoing human rights
violations in Sudan, President George W. Bush expanded U.S. sanctions against
Sudan."' These sanctions were somewhat limited, however, in that they did not
prohibit U.S. persons from making investments in foreign companies based in
Uniform International Wills Act, NAT'L CONF. COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST.
LAWS, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=International
%20WillS%20Act (last visited Oct. 7, 201), with M. READ MOORE, TAX AND Es-
TATE PLANNING ISSUES FOR U.S. CLIENTS WHO OWN FOREIGN PROPERTY (2011)
(listing thirty states and territories). The absence of an easily accessible and accu-
rate count of participating states makes tracking and measuring the progress to-
ward full implementation and ratification more challenging.
134. The status of the Wills Convention is somewhat confusing. The Senate has given
advice and consent to ratification and the President has signed the instrument of
ratification. See 137 CONG. REC. 21,866 (1991). Nonetheless, because the United
States has not deposited its instrument of ratification, the treaty is not considered
ratified. See 7 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 214 (2009),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/121620.pdf ("U.S. con-
sular officers cannot execute the certificate under the Uniform International Wills
Act because the United States has not, to date, become a party to the Convention
Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will of October 26,
1973.").
135. Ku, supra note 113, at 504.
136. See Exec. Order No. 13,412, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,369 (Oct. 13, 2006) (revising economic
sanctions imposed against Sudan pursuant to Exec. Order. No. 13,o67, 62 Fed.
Reg. 59,989 (Nov. 3, 1997)); Blocking Property of Persons in Connection with the
Conflict in Sudan's Darfur Region, Exec. Order No. 13,400, 71 Fed. Reg. 25,483
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countries that do not prohibit doing business in Sudan."3 7 Dissatisfied with the
limitations of the federal divestment initiative, a number of states (prompted by
the advocacy efforts of civil society organizations) took independent measures
to divest from the Sudanese government and its business partners.' After a
successful district court challenge threatened the viability of these initiatives,"9
Congress enacted the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007
(SADA), which explicitly permits state and local divestment from Sudan, in ad-
dition to strengthening federal divestment. 40 This congressional intervention in
turn prompted more states to adopt their own divestment measures.141
137. See Perry S. Bechky, Darfur, Divestment, and Dialogue, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 823,
835-36 (2009). Professor Perry Bechky explains that the U.S. Department of
Treasury
has taken the position that its regulations do not prohibit U.S. persons
from making investments in non-Sudanese third country companies
doing business in Sudan .. . provided that such companies are not owned
or controlled by the Government of Sudan or predominantly dedicated
to or derive the predominant portion of their revenues from investments,
projects, or other economic activities in Sudan.
Id. at 835 n.53 (alteration in original) (internal quotations marks and citation
omitted). Nor did they block state pension funds from investing in companies
with business dealings in Sudan. Id. at 836.
138. See John B. Reynolds III & Maureen E. Thorson, California, Illinois and Other
States Have Sudan Divestment Legislation: What Do You Need To Know?,
WILEYREIN LLP (Oct. 5, 20o6), http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp
=articles&id=1947.
139. The State of Illinois adopted a particularly aggressive approach, enacting a series
of legislative provisions requiring the State Treasurer and state pension funds to
divest from entities affiliated with the Sudanese government, companies engaged
in business in the Sudan, or banks that do not impose reporting requirements on
their loan applicants regarding their associations with the Sudanese government.
See Act To End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan, 15 Ill. Comp. Stat. 520/22.5
(2005). This legislation was then challenged in federal district court by the Na-
tional Foreign Trade Council. In support of its position, the Council cited the Su-
preme Court's decision in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade, 530 U.S. 363 (2000),
which struck down similar state legislation that barred state entities from buying
goods or services from companies doing business in Burma. The district court is-
sued its decision invalidating Illinois's legislation based on Crosby in February
2007. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
140. Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub, L. No. 110-74, 121 Stat.
2516. The Act provides that "a State or local government may adopt and enforce
measures to divest the assets of the State or local government from, or prohibit
investment of the assets of the State or local government in, persons that the State
or local government determines are conducting or have direct investments in
business operations in" Sudan. Id. § 3(b). States are required to provide the Justice
Department with notice of their intent to divest. Id. § 3(c). SADA also provided
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SADA is unlike the earlier examples in that the initiative for increased
divestment in Sudan came "up" from the states, rather than "down" from the
federal government. Thus, states were involved in setting the nation's interna-
tional agenda, rather than just cooperating in its implementation. The federal
response in this case was also creative. Rather than cutting off state innovation
either by allowing the district court's decision to stand or by passing preemptive
federal legislation dictating a national position, "Congress opened the door to
state and local involvement in just the kind of foreign affairs questions that have
typically been claimed to fall-as a matter of necessity-within the exclusive
orbit of the federal government."' Thus, this strategy has resulted in ongoing,
concurrent regulatory activity at both the state and federal levels of govern-
ment.
SADA is thus the most dynamic of these examples. Nonetheless, even
though SADA represents a federal posture that is supportive of a collaborative
relationship with the states, the divestment task is, like providing consular noti-
fication or adopting a process for executing valid international wills, relatively
easy to define and divide along jurisdictional boundaries. Essentially, the legisla-
tion shifted responsibility and control over these initiatives to the states, but it is
doing little beyond that to encourage or draw upon subnational innovation.
4. Lessons from the Case Studies
These examples demonstrate that different models of state-federal engage-
ment can successfully stimulate subnational participation in treaty implementa-
tion. Nonetheless, although each of these examples involves state-federal coop-
eration, the fact that both levels of government are participants does not mean
that there is actually ongoing interaction in areas governed by competing
sources of authority. Rather, the success of these partnerships seems linked to
the dualist approach that was taken with respect to their implementation. With
regard to the Wills Convention, the problem of jurisdictional overlap was
resolved prior to the adoption of the instrument, with specific model legislation
drafted for the states and the federal government that reflected the division of
authority and responsibility. In the Vienna Convention context, the lines of
for increased federal divestment from Sudan, including new provisions requiring
companies seeking contracts with the federal government to certify that they are
not doing business with Sudan. Id. § 6(a).
141. Following SADA, several additional states passed divestment legislation. As of
July 2010, thirty states and the District of Columbia had divested from Sudan.
See Who Has Divested, INVESTORS AGAINST GENOCIDE, http://www
.investorsagainstgenocide.net/pageloo4 (last visited June 15, 2011). This group in-
cludes the states that usually exhibit incorporationist behavior-like California,
Massachusetts, and New York-but also many more, like North Carolina, Indi-
ana, Kansas, Texas, and Wyoming, which are not generally known for their en-
gagement with human rights. See id.
142. Ahdieh, supra note 105, at 1194.
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authority were already clear since the treaty right was triggered by arrest. Be-
cause the tasks at issue in these cases are fairly straightforward and conducive to
jurisdictional line drawing, a relatively dualist approach was sufficient to initiate
subnational participation. Finally, through the enactment of SADA, Congress
explicitly freed the states to pursue their own divestment strategies, parallel with
the efforts of the federal government.
This is not to say, however, that this dualist model of interaction was the
best option in these cases. To the contrary, it may have exacted a cost in terms
of reaching full compliance with the goals of these initiatives. The divvying up
of areas of authority and the delinking of the state and federal implementation
projects may have stopped the dialogic interactions that could have built
momentum toward full domestication of the treaty instruments. In both cases,
a more dynamic approach, although more challenging to implement, could
have been more successful.
For example, despite the clear division of authority in the Wills Conven-
tion, its adoption has yet to be completed. Over thirty years after the Uniform
Law Commissioners approved the Wills Act, less than half of the states and
territories have passed the necessary legislation, and the instrument of ratifica-
tion has not been deposited.143 A dynamic approach could help reinvigorate this
initiative by reengaging the states and the federal government in viewing
implementation of the Convention as a cooperative project. By adopting the ac-
companying federal legislation and publicizing the new state-level activities, the
federal government could help to stimulate state-level activity by demonstrating
federal commitment to the implementation project and support for state-level
implementation initiatives. Similarly, increased state-level ratification activity,
perhaps prompted by the efforts of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, could spark new interest in the ratification process and
possibly stimulate the passage of the proposed federal legislation.
A dynamic approach could have had even more dramatic consequences in
the VCCR case. In a dualist move (albeit a strange one), 44 the Supreme Court
143. See Why States Should Adopt UIWA, NAT'L CONF. COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
ST. LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Whyo/%2oStates%2OShould
%2oAdopt%2oUIWA (last visited June 14, 2011) (listing states and noting that the
United States has not yet ratified the Wills Convention).
144. Under a traditional dualist model, the responsibility for treaty implementation
would fall squarely on the federal government. The Court instead chose to draw a
jurisdictional line, leaving the states with the responsibility for curing their own
violations. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 345-47 (2oo6). Justice Ste-
vens's concurrence in Medellin most explicitly explains this move. He writes:
Under the express terms of the Supremacy Clause, the United States'
obligation to "undertak[e] to comply" with the [International Court of
Justice]'s decision falls on each of the States as well as the Federal Gov-
ernment. One consequence of our form of government is that sometimes
States must shoulder the primary responsibility for protecting the honor
and integrity of the Nation. Texas's duty in this respect is all the greater
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closed the door to individual remedies for VCCR violations by rejecting its own
authority to require state courts to provide such a remedy. By contrast, a
dynamic approach would have permitted overlapping jurisdictional authority
over VCCR remedies and could have struck a balance between preserving state
autonomy and ensuring state compliance with U.S. treaty obligations under the
VCCR.14 1 Dissenting in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, Justice Breyer outlined how
this relationship could have worked. ' Justice Breyer would have held that the
VCCR was enforceable in U.S. courts, but he would have required the states to
resolve any Convention violations in the first instance, subject to review by the
federal courts only to determine whether the state solution was consistent with
the Convention's demand for an effective remedy.'47 This model would have
allowed for a dynamic process through which a range of "effective" remedies
could have been developed through horizontal and vertical dialogue.141 Instead,
the Court's line-drawing exercise essentially ended the dialogue over remedies
and left the states with plenary control over state-level treaty compliance, pend-
ing the enactment of federal legislation. 14 9
Finally, SADA offers the most dynamic model of the three treaties men-
tioned, yet its approach is still concentrated on creating space for subnational
action, rather than generating dialogue between federal and state entities. Ra-
ther than simply freeing the states to pursue their own initiatives, the federal
government could have drawn upon their experience to expand upon its own
divestment policies and to encourage additional activities among other states.
since it was Texas that-by failing to provide consular notice in accor-
dance with the Vienna Convention-ensnared the United States in the
current controversy.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 536 (20o8) (Stevens, J., concurring) (first altera-
tion in original) (quoting U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1). Justice Stevens then urged
Texas to take on the modest cost of compliance and to review and reconsider Jose
Medellin's sentence, id. at 537, which Texas declined to do, Ex parte Medellin, 280
S.W.3d 854, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
145. See Kalb, Dynamic Federalism, supra note 6, at 1049-59.
146. 548 U.S. 331 (20o8) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 365-98.
148. See Kalb, Dynamic Federalism, supra note 6, at 1054.
149. As of this writing, federal legislation has just been introduced that would reaffirm
the United States' duty to provide consular notification and give federal courts ju-
risdiction to review petitions claiming violations of Article 36 in death penalty
cases. To obtain relief, the petitioner would have to show actual prejudice-in
which case the court would be authorized to order a new trial or sentencing pro-
ceeding. See Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011, S. 1194, 112th Cong.
(2011), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BilTextConsular
NotificationComplianceAct.pdf. The passage of this bill could advance the dialo-
gue over Vienna Convention remedies, given the interest of state courts and legis-
latures in ensuring the viability of state criminal judgments.
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One way of characterizing the lesson of SADA is to say that dualism permitted
the federal government to legislatively pass the buck to the states. A more
dynamic approach, on the other hand, would have maintained federal interest
and engagement in state initiatives in order to maximize the desired policy
outcome.
In sum, a more dualist approach to treaty implementation can operate as
both a boon and a burden. From these examples, it appears that divvying up the
tasks of treaty implementation along jurisdictional lines can help promote
subnational involvement by making the areas of responsibility and authority
clear. Nonetheless, it can also lead to ossification and paralysis by limiting the
federal-subnational interactions that, whether coercive or not, could work to
stimulate ongoing interest and engagement with these projects.
C. Moving Toward Dynamism
The dualist cooperative approach offered a qualified success in the three
cases above. By contrast, the particular challenge of human rights treaty imple-
mentation is that the dualist view is difficult to impose on some of these
instruments given the cross-cutting nature of the rights they protect. Perhaps
not coincidentally, those human rights treaties that have been implemented
through federal legislation are the most conducive to a dualist approach."o
The human rights treaties that have not been federally implemented (both
ratified and unratified) provide for much broader guarantees that are necessari-
ly multijurisdictional and multifaceted in scope. For example, ICCPR provides
that "[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State.""' Thus, parties to ICCPR are
required to "take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibili-
ties of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution."152 Enforc-
ing this guarantee requires consideration of its impact on a variety of legal
regimes, particularly those governing employment, marriage, and divorce."'
These are areas that have previously been the subject of both state and federal
150. Both the Genocide Convention and CAT require the contracting parties to crimi-
nalize and punish certain kinds of acts. By making the specified crimes punishable
under federal law, the United States can fulfill its treaty commitments, even
though the states could presumably adopt parallel legislation. CAT also prohibits
State Parties from returning or extraditing any person to a state where there are
substantial grounds to believe that the person might be subject to torture, a
process which is under federal control. CAT, supra note ii, at 114.
151. ICCPR, supra note io, at 179.
152. Id.
153. For example, this provision might require reconsideration of laws governing pa-
rental leave and the presumptions underlying the disposition of assets and divi-
sion of custody in the event of divorce.
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law.'5 4 CERD goes a step further, explicitly requiring consideration of the role of
subnational entities in enforcing its guarantees. It provides that "[e]ach State
Party shall take effective measures to review governmental, national, and local
policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have
the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists."'
The rights that these treaties protect thus cut both horizontally across a number
of subject matter areas and vertically through multiple layers of regulatory au-
thority. Furthermore, the exact nature of the implementation tasks that the
treaty requires is more difficult to define; as the San Francisco example demon-
strates, fully implementing these treaties requires a holistic analysis of a variety
of different legal regimes. These ambiguities leave both the states and federal
government without clearly delineated roles or tasks in the implementation
process and are, arguably, a significant reason why even the incorporationist
states and localities have generally failed to engage.
This account helps to explain why even the incorporationists have demon-
strated more interest in the unratified human rights treaties. As the earlier
discussion of these instruments demonstrated, most of the subnational activity
related to the unratified treaties does not attempt to enforce the guarantees
these instruments protect. Rather, it is more accurately characterized as a pro-
test by a variety of subnational actors of the federal government's failure to act
appropriately within a designated sphere of national authority."6 When the feder-
al government has failed to ratify a treaty, the incorporationists see a role for
themselves in advocating for federal action; however, once the treaty is
accepted, their job becomes more ambiguous and may even appear to have
been eliminated.'57
Moreover, even for those actors who would go further, there is a challenge
in determining how to translate the broad requirements of implementation into
154. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006). Federal regula-
tion of marriage and divorce is generally constitutional, and the passage of the
Defense of Marriage Act in 1996, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006), which defines marriage for
federal purposes as between one man and one woman, opened the door for in-
creased federal regulation of family structures.
155. CERD, supra note io, at 218.
156. See Powell, supra note 16, at 279 ("[M]uch of the local CEDAW work is directed
toward the goal of building momentum to pressure the U.S. government to ratify
CEDAW, rather than enlisting cities and states to function as laboratories for a
range of experimentation.").
157. Of course, it is possible that we are only at the beginning of the story with the
unratified treaties. Were these subnational protests successful in stimulating fed-
eral ratification of CEDAW, for example, they could represent the beginning of a
cooperative implementation approach. Alternatively, as has been the case with the
other major human rights treaties, ratification could actually be the end of state
and local engagement with the implementation project, as CEDAW would then
become a federal responsibility.
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actionable programs. Unlike in the case studies previously discussed, there are
no clearly divisible jurisdictional lines in human rights treaties. Promoting
increased engagement with these treaties will thus require an approach farther
along the cooperative federalist spectrum than the approaches that were suc-
cessfully applied in these cases. Even if there were federal leadership on these
questions, it is hard to envision a federal educational campaign that could pro-
vide states and localities with a clear set of directives to follow that would satisfy
their CERD commitments."' Similarly, it is difficult to conceive of a set of uni-
form laws that could be adopted to ensure state compliance with ICCPR. En-
couraging subnational participation will require changing the narrative around
human rights treaty implementation at all levels of government to one that is
less focused on divvying up responsibilities and more accepting of the ambigui-
ties and possibilities of jurisdictional overlap. Rather than drawing lines, this
model would attempt to promote an ongoing process of experimentation and
exchange, both vertically and horizontally, in order to clarify and concretize the
ambitions expressed in these instruments.59
The challenge, then, is how to create a dynamic federalist relationship
where none currently exists. In the final Part, I will offer some preliminary
thoughts on how the federal government could encourage dynamism in human
rights treaty implementation-and, by extension, in the fulfillment of the
United States' other international obligations.
III. CREATING DYNAMISM
The reality of the modern federalist state is that most regulatory areas are
subject to ongoing and overlapping jurisdiction by multiple authorities.
Because of their broad guarantees, human rights treaties give rise to particularly
complex interactions among federal and subnational actors. What I have argued
158. This is not to say, however, that these states and cities would be operating within a
void. With the increased U.S. participation in human rights monitoring, see supra
notes 60-63 and accompanying text, has come more guidance from the U.N.
monitoring bodies. This provides content upon which states could draw in mov-
ing toward implementation.
159. There is a tension, of course, between these treaties' demand for universal ac-
knowledgement of the fundamental rights they embody and the inevitable varia-
tion that would come with dynamism. See Ahdieh, supra note 105, at 1237. None-
theless, constitutional rights are also presumptively universal within a particular
domestic context-yet the dialogue between state and federal courts has proven
productive in areas such as constitutional criminal procedure. See Robert M. Cov-
er & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court,
86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1049-50 (1977). Experimentation, and the resulting uncertainty,
is a necessary and valuable step in translating even the most core rights. Moreo-
ver, this strategy of "intersystemic governance"-avoiding, as it does, the
top-down imposition of norms-"may offer a way for jurisdictions to internalize
universal norms gradually, on their own terms." Ahdieh, supra note 1os, at 1237.
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here is that the nature of this federalist relationship (and the design of the
framework necessary to support it) must be determined by reference to the
substantive task at hand and how it could benefit from maximizing the values
that dynamism has to offer. This task is easier if each model of cooperative fede-
ralism is viewed not as sui generis, but rather as a point along a continuum
from dualism to dynamism.
In the area of treaty implementation, there are still some instruments that
fall almost exclusively within the province of the federal government, such as an
agreement on nuclear arms reduction. Subnational participation in implemen-
tation is not necessary for the United States to meet its commitments under this
type of treaty, although resolutions of support (like the ones adopted for
CEDAW) for these initiatives could be helpful in prompting federal action. The
VCCR and the Wills Convention fall more toward the middle of the spectrum.
Historic' distinctions in the subject matter governed by the states and the fed-
eral government mean that a cooperative approach will lead to more successful
integration of these rights into existing legal regimes. Finally, the structure of
the ratified human rights treaties is such that ongoing efforts at the federal,
state, and local levels are necessary to fully domesticate their commitments.
The task of treaty implementation thus demonstrates a wide range of possi-
ble partnerships and shows both how ambiguity can stymie initiative and how
structure can enable it. The cases that I have reviewed demonstrate that greater
state participation will require a more explicit reframing of the question of re-
sponsibility for ratified human rights treaties. The model of jurisdictional au-
thority should shift away from the current dichotomy (that either the federal or
the state government is responsible) toward an ongoing collaboration (where
the state and federal governments have a shared and overlapping responsibility
for ensuring that the United States' commitments are kept). Moreover, greater
subnational engagement will demand a process by which the requirements of
these treaties are given more explicit definition. The role of the federal govern-
ment in this process should therefore be to stimulate, enable, and moderate an
ongoing "diagonal""' dialogue about how to evaluate and implement these
160. I say "historic" in this context, as opposed to "constitutional," because I am refer-
ring to the established bodies of law and practice built up around these traditional
distinctions that make state participation necessary and productive for full
implementation of these treaties. For example, the federal government could have
passed federal legislation implementing the Wills Convention. However, because
wills are usually governed by state law and practitioners are used to looking to
state law in this context, implementation will be more successful and complete if
the mandates of the Convention are incorporated into state law where they can be
seamlessly integrated into existing practice. In the VCCR context, the state role is
even more obvious, given that the rights are triggered by the actions of state and
local law enforcement and therefore can most efficiently be administered by out-
reach at that level.
161. Professor Hari Osofsky has proposed the helpful notion of "diagonal regulation"
as a way of describing regulatory initiatives that "cut[] across both vertical (mul-
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treaty rights. The federal role would thus look different than it did in the cases
examined in Part III in that it would be less about educating states as to their
part in a predesigned implementation program, and more about encouraging
and harnessing state and local innovation. To some extent, such collaboration
occurred in those examples; however, in the human rights treaty context, the
focus on uniformity would be less of a priority-and, in fact, it could even be a
hindrance to the opportunity for innovation created by jurisdictional redun-
dancy and overlap. It should be clear, therefore, that the federal programs de-
scribed in the case studies described above are inadequate to the task of encour-
aging subnational engagement with human rights treaties. Promoting a truly
dynamic federalist approach to treaty implementation will require a structure
that supports ongoing experimentation and dialogue.
As an initial matter, this strategy would require a reframing of the federal-
ism understanding as a mandate, rather than a barrier. As previously discussed,
the message from the federal government to the states as to their obligations
under these treaties has been ambiguous at best. This is likely the result of the
federal government's unwillingness to acknowledge any implementation obliga-
tion that would require affirmative action at either the state or federal level, as
well as uncertainty as to whether it may require state and local compliance con-
sistent with the Constitutionl62 and the ratification RUDs. As earlier examples
demonstrate, however, a coercive posture is not the only one available to the
federal government with respect to subnational treaty activity. Instead, the fed-
eral government could actively promote a more decentralized model of human
rights treaty implementation as a way of empowering state and local actors.
The discussion here provides some guidance as to the design features that
are likely necessary for success. First, a characteristic shared by the examples
given above is that they rely in part on the voluntary cooperation of willing
states and localities. This kind of implementation strategy provokes two com-
mon objections. The first objection is that it is unlikely to work. Professor Les-
ley Wexler, for example, suggests that the successes in human rights treaty im-
plementation have been limited to a handful of small and extremely liberal
tiple levels of government) and horizontal (branches of government or other enti-
ties functioning at the same level) divisions of governance." Hari M. Osofsky, Is
Climate Change "International"? Litigation's Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J.
INT'L L. 585, 591 (2009) (citation omitted). This model is appropriate in the con-
text of human rights treaty implementation, as I describe it here, which involves
an ongoing, dialogic collaboration between and among state, local, federal, and
international actors, acknowledging as it does the need for cooperation and colla-
boration.
162. Certainly such actions would be upheld under existing Supreme Court precedent;
nonetheless, the academic and political attacks that have been launched against
this reading of the treaty power may make even its supporters unwilling to test the
continuing strength of the doctrine. See Kalb, Dynamic Federalism, supra note 6,
at 1033-34.
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cities."3 As the discussion of CRC demonstrates, this may no longer be an accu-
rate characterization of local participation in the U.N. human rights treaties.6 4
Moreover, the group of interested subnational players expands considerably
when other types of local engagement with rights-related issues of international
law and foreign affairs are included, as the SADA example demonstrates. There-
fore, I am not as pessimistic as Wexler about the possibility that these pockets of
subnational activity could work to trigger broader acceptance of these human
rights norms nationally,' particularly if, as I suggest below, the treaty guaran-
tees were disaggregated into more actionable goals."'
The second major objection to a voluntary approach is that it is inade-
quately respectful of the United States' treaty commitments or of the universali-
ty of human rights principles."' Putting aside the reality that a more coercive
federal approach may not be politically possible at present, 6 part of my goal in
this discussion has been to challenge the notion that success with respect to the
ratified treaties is defined as the achievement of uniform federal implementing
legislation., Voluntary participation among even the more traditionally incor-
163. See Lesley Wexler, Take the Long Way Home: Sub-Federal Integration of Unratified
and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Law, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 38-39 (2006).
164. See, e.g., supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing subnational en-
gagement with CRC, including in more conservative cities in the West and Mid-
west).
165. See Wexler, supra note 65, at 627-28.
166. See infra pp. 116-117-
167. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 Co-
LUM. L. REV. 403, 487 n.321 (2003) (noting the difficulties associated with allowing
the states to commandeer the treaty power); Janet R. Carter, Note, Commandeer-
ing Under the Treaty Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 598, 611-14 (2001) (discussing the
shortcomings of Congress attaching conditions to the disbursement of federal
funds to the states in the treaty implementation context).
168. Melish also proposes a United States Commission on Human Rights, which
"would serve as an independent check on implementation failures, providing a fo-
rum through which individuals could report abuses and seek political or qua-
si-judicial address at the domestic level." Melish, supra note 5, at 459. Given the
federal government's general unwillingness to require action by the states toward
treaty implementation, the creation of the Commission is probably unlikely in the
near future. See Kalb, Dynamic Federalism, supra note 6, at 1047-48 (discussing
political aversion at the federal level to imposing the mandates of the human
rights treaties through federal legislation).
169. 1 am certainly not the first to propose that there is value in diversity. See, e.g.,
Powell, supra note 16, at 254 ("Even assuming that the federal government under-
took greater leadership in ratifying additional human rights treaties, in more fully
implementing those it has not ratified, or in withdrawing reservations to treaty
provisions, the argument here is that there would still be a value in state and local
participation."). My suggestion is that if the push for subnational engagement
were to be reframed away from the ultimate goal of promoting ratification or fed-
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porationist states and cities, like San Francisco, Chicago, and New York, could
help change the narrative from one of federal dominance to one with significant
space for local control and initiative, which in turn could translate into deeper
and more concrete engagement with the rights that these treaties embody.'
This process could itself lead to an increase in the number of states and cities
that explicitly acknowledge their role in implementing treaty standards.
Noncoercive implementation models have had some success in improving
outcomes in the domestic context-particularly when they come with financial
incentives. The federal Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) within the
Department of Justice has relied on a strategy of providing financial and tech-
nical assistance to states and localities to build their capacity toward reducing
violence against women.1 '? Since its creation in 1995, "OVW has awarded nearly
four billion dollars in grants and cooperative agreements" to promote the goals
of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)."' Despite the purely voluntary
nature of this program, it has succeeded in engaging at least some communities
in all fifty states in working toward the goals of the Act.'73 OVW has also devel-
oped a number of special, targeted initiatives to address "particularly acute
challenges" in order to "explore innovations in the violence against women field
and share knowledge that can be replicated nationwide."7 4
The VAWA strategy could be extended to the treaty implementation
process. Like the international human rights treaties, the national discussion of
VAWA has sometimes prompted intense political resistance."'7 However, since
OVW makes grants available for a variety of programs, states may pick and
choose which of the goals of VAWA they pursue. As a result, the national effort
to reduce the incidence of violence against women has increased overall. Like-
eral legislation, then the nature of that participation would become more substan-
tive.
170. See id. at 279 ("Besides the value of building political momentum, this local treaty
work also helps to translate broad abstract principles contained in human rights
treaties into concrete, definable standards on the ground.").
171. See Office on Violence Against Women, About the Office, U.S. DEPARTMENT
JusT., http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/overview.htm (last visited Feb. lo, 2on).
172. Id.
173. See Office on Violence Against Women, Awards, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST.,
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/grantactivities.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2011).
174. Office on Violence Against Women, supra note 171.
175. For example, when the Violence Against Women Act was being considered for
reauthorization, opponents argued that it funds "radical feminists," discriminates
against men, is antifamily, and is unnecessary. See, e.g., Wendy McElroy, Congress
Should Kill Discriminatory Domestic Violence Act, Fox NEWS (June 30, 2005),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/o,2933,16O289,oo.html; Phyllis Schlafly, A Good
Father's Day Gift, TOWNHALL (June 19, 2010), http://www.townhall.com/
columnists/phyllisschlafly/20lo/o6/19/a-good-fathers-day-gift/page/full/.
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wise, a similar federal funding body dedicated to treaty implementation could
solicit state participation on a variety of treaty goals, which could result in col-
laboration with even some of the more skeptical states and localities on areas of
common ground. For example, New Orleans, although not generally included
on the "incorporationist" list, might apply for a grant through the National
Office to consider whether and how its jails and penitentiaries maximize the
possibilities for "reformation" and "social rehabilitation" for prisoners in line
with the requirements of ICCPR.17 ' The VAWA program is one of a variety of
forms of dynamic relationships that currently exist within our federalist system
that could be replicated within the human rights treaty context. The key varia-
ble distinguishing these forms of dynamic relationships is the amount of coer-
cive pressure that the federal government is willing to bring to bear on states
and localities to achieve its goals.
An additional feature that may help stimulate dynamism is the subdivision
of the treaty's guarantees into more manageable tasks. As I have argued, the
more successful cases have involved rights that are easily actionable-both
because they are concrete and because the tasks they entail are divisible along
jurisdictional lines. Although the human rights treaties do not deal with such
actionable rights, one way to initiate engagement with this implementation
project is to develop more concrete tasks within the broader dynamic project.
The implementation task for these treaties is not monolithic, nor is there neces-
sarily a well-defined end point at which compliance is achieved. A more realistic
goal, therefore, is to engage states and localities in a process of considering what
these guarantees mean and how they can be translated into domestic policy
changes. By breaking down the general project of treaty implementation into a
variety of different area initiatives, as OVW did with VAWA, the federal gov-
ernment could increase overall subnational engagement. The potential hazard
of this approach, as the Vienna Convention and Wills Convention examples
demonstrate, is that drawing lines of authority can result in stagnation in the
process by breaking down dialogue along vertical and horizontal jurisdictional
boundaries. The divvying up of tasks, however, is different from the divvying up
of authority over the project. Maintaining the dialogue across and between
actors at different levels of government (perhaps even as a condition of fund-
ing) could help ensure that the process of concretizing the treaty commitments
does not stymie the development of a dynamic relationship. As the United
States increasingly includes the activities of states and localities in its reports to
the U.N. monitoring bodies, the federal government generates and maintains a
conversation with subnational actors."'
176. ICCPR, supra note io, at 176. For an overview of the issues plaguing the Orleans
Parish Prison System, see SAFE STREETS/STRONG COMMUNITIES, BIG JAILS AND
BIG COSTS: THE INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE COSTS OF OVER-INCARCERATION
IN NEW ORLEANS (2006), available at http://www.safestreetsnola.org/pdfs/
big-jails-big-costs.pdf.
177. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. For a more extensive discussion of
the possibilities created by the reporting requirements, see Risa Kaufman, By
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Most significantly, the case studies demonstrate that the promotion of the
dynamic relationship necessary to meet the nation's human rights commit-
ments will require not just the creation of space for state activity, but also the
development of an administrative structure for proactively encouraging and
leveraging state innovation. In other words, because of its demand for repeated,
ongoing cross-jurisdictional interactions, dynamic federalism requires an insti-
tutionalized supporting structure to capture and link these exchanges over time.
Some of the existing proposals for increasing state and local treaty compliance
could fill this role. For example, Professor Tara Melish has offered a compre-
hensive program for promoting a "subsidiarity-based national human rights
infrastructure""' in the United States that would include the creation of a
National Office on Human Rights Implementation. The National Office would
focus on ensuring treaty compliance at the federal level through coordination
with each of the different agencies and departments of government. Additional-
ly, it would "play an important facilitative role with respect to the human rights
implementation initiatives undertaken by state and local authorities" by "col-
Some Other Means: Considering the Federal Role in Subnational Human Rights Im-
plementation, 33 CARDOzo L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
178. Melish, supra note 5, at 453. The subsidiarity principle, as Melish explains, "re-
quires that problems be solved where they occur, by those who understand them
best, and by those who are most affected by them" and thus protects more loca-
lized social or political units from preemption. Id. at 439. However, it also requires
intervention from large political units "whenever smaller social or political group-
ings cannot ensure the protection of human dignity without assistance." Id. at
440. This intervention may occur through "directing, watching, urging, restrain-
ing, as occasion requires and necessity demands." Id. (quoting Paolo G. Carozza,
Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 42 (2003)). The notion of subsidiarity thus captures one of the core chal-
lenges of the human rights project that dynamic federalism is intended to resolve:
"how to square the idea of universal international standards with the tendency
toward localism and particularity." Powell, supra note 16, at 253. And Melish's
subsidiarity-based approach to treaty implementation provides a good starting
point for conceptualizing the administrative structure that is most likely to pro-
mote a dynamic relationship, given its focus on empowering subnational entities
while also enabling national oversight and information sharing.
There is historical precedent for the kind of approach Melish advocates. Pres-
ident Clinton established an Inter-Agency Working Group on Human Rights to
coordinate federal agency participation in the implementation of these treaties
and to improve monitoring of state and territorial compliance. See Exec. Order
No. 13107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991, 68,991-92 (Dec. 1o, 1998). However, the Working
Group only operated for two years and was abandoned by the Bush Administra-
tion during a restructuring of the National Security Council system. See Melish,
supra note 5, at 401-02. The American Constitution Society has encouraged the
Obama Administration to reinvigorate the Working Group. See CATHERINE
POWELL, AM. CONsT. Soc'Y FOR L. & POL'Y, HUMAN RIGHTS AT HOME: A DOMES-
TIC POLICY BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 3-5 (20o8).
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lect[ing] information, shar[ing] best practices, and provid[ing] publicity."17 9
This kind of institutionalized federal entity, with the goal and mandate of en-
couraging and promoting an ongoing dialogue, is likely necessary to maximize
the benefits of cooperation in the federal-subnational relationship. And given
the United States' ratification commitment to remove any barriers to state and
local treaty implementation,So the federal government should take an active
role in encouraging a dynamic approach as a way of getting beyond the current
impasse.
Although a formalized institutional presence at the national level would
send a strong signal of federal commitment to subnational initiatives, in the in-
terim (and should such a program prove politically or fiscally impossible at
present), dynamism could be generated through the initiative and support of
nongovernmental actors. All of the case studies discussed in this Article rely
heavily on local and national civil society organizations to make the connection
between and among receptive local partners-and between state, local, and fed-
eral governments. These organizations are currently filling the institutional gap
left open by federal inaction by creating grassroots support for these initiatives,
developing and publicizing model programs, and collecting and sharing best
practices. Moreover, many of these organizations are thinking expansively
about the possibilities of state and local implementation efforts as a way of do-
mestically embedding the norms within the human rights treaties and of creat-
ing support for change at both the local and national levels.'"' These initiatives
have in many ways been successful in beginning to promote the use of a human
rights viewpoint in the policy considerations of states and cities nationwide.
As the successes in the incorporationist states and localities suggest, many
of the advocacy efforts of these organizations have been focused on the unrati-
fied treaties, perhaps because of the (likely accurate) perception that more work
is required in these areas. The rights guaranteed in the ratified treaties like
ICCPR and CERD are generally covered in both federal and state law (although
179. Melish, supra note 5, at 458.
180. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
181. For example, the Bringing Human Rights Home Lawyers' Network, an initiative
of the Columbia Human Rights Institute, has 390 members representing domestic
and international justice advocacy groups and law school human rights programs.
The network coordinates and provides support to its members in their efforts to
incorporate international human rights law into their domestic advocacy efforts.
See Bringing Human Rights Home Lawyers' Network, COLUMBIA L. SCH.,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center-program/human-rights/HRinUS/BHRHLaw
Net (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). The Human Rights at Home Campaign, also
spearheaded by the Columbia Human Rights Institute, has a state and local gov-
ernment coordination subcommittee, which is dedicated to building the capacity
of state and local human rights and relations commissions, as well as other state
and local officials, to integrate and implement human rights treaties into their
work. E-mail from Risa Kaufman, Exec. Dir., Columbia Human Rights Inst., to
author (June 29, 2011, 22:45 EDT) (on file with author).
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in a diminished form), whereas the protections in the unratified treaties gener-
ally have no domestic counterpart. Moreover, because of the many difficulties
inherent in arguing that even the ratified instruments represent a binding, legal
commitment, advocates may believe (also correctly) that the persuasive value of
human rights principles is an easier sell than reliance on formal treaty frame-
works. Thus, there are strategic reasons why advocates may make rights-related
arguments in a way that deemphasizes their formal weight within the U.S. legal
system. This strategy may, however, come at a cost. While the federalism under-
standing may have been intended to reduce opposition to these treaties by sig-
naling that they would not be enforced against the states, it still offers a real
mandate for interested states and cities to proactively pursue the goals of the
ratified treaty instruments and to demand federal assistance in overcoming any
barriers to their ability to do so. Thus, there is some value in taking the federal-
ism understanding seriously and encouraging its subnational beneficiaries to do
the same.
This is particularly true given the intersecting nature of the rights that these
human rights instruments seek to protect."' In fact, Professor Melish contends
that "[t] here are... virtually no substantive issues arising under the CEDAW,
CRC, and ICESCR that cannot in some way be addressed under ICCPR, CERD,
and CAT supervisory procedures."'" Thus, it is possible that the realization of
the goals of even the unratified treaties could be significantly advanced through
subnational efforts to implement the ratified treaties. Considering how particu-
lar subject matters are covered by both the ratified and unratified treaty instru-
ments allows advocates to argue for policy changes both in terms of persuasive
authority and legal commitment.
Moreover, tying human rights principles back to the treaties-and back to
the nation's formal international obligations-helps connect these initiatives
nationally and internationally. Human rights advocacy organizations have
already achieved some successes by breaking down some of the treaty guaran-
tees into actionable issues. Yet even so, if these programs are not situated within
the broader international legal framework, they do less to engage in the dynam-
ic interaction than what I have argued is necessary for fuller implementation.
For example, the Washington State Human Rights Commission has been work-
ing toward resolving the state's housing shortage for farmworkers.18 4 In report-
ing its findings, the Commission situated the problem within a human rights
framework, drawing on Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which provides for housing as a basic human right.' The Commission
182. Melish, supra note 5, at 397 n-34 ("There is .. . wide overlap in the rights protected
in distinct human rights treaties.").
183. Id. at 430.
184. See COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS INST., supra note 19, at 7.
185. See WASH. STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, FARM WORKER HOUSING AND
THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 2 (2007), available at
http://content.knowledgeplex.org/kp2/cache/documents/17830/1783o6.pdf.
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could, however, have gone further in drawing connections between the local
housing crisis and the United States' commitments under international treaty
law. For example, the report identifies racial and national origin discrimination
as a major driver of the housing shortage for the farmworker population. The
Commission could therefore have tied the resolution of this problem to the
United States' legal commitment under CERD "to prohibit and to eliminate
racial discrimination .. . and to guarantee the right of everyone, without dis-
tinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, . . . [tihe right to hous-
ing."'" The Commission could also have drawn the connection between its
initiatives and ICESCR, which commits State Parties to recognize the rights of
all people to adequate housing.' The impact of these references would be to
situate Washington State's activities within the legal framework of the nation's
commitments. They would make explicit the connection between the state's ac-
tivities and the country's ability to fulfill its legal obligation under CERD-and
help close the gap between present conditions and the ICESCR standards, thus
helping clear the path toward ratification."' Like the San Francisco CEDAW
program, framing the state's housing initiative as a fulfillment of the nation's
commitments would push the federal government to acknowledge, respond to,
and assist the effort, thereby helping to generate a dynamic collaboration. Thus,
strategically, it makes sense to frame these independent state and local initia-
tives within the broader context of fulfilling the United States' obligations
under international human rights law even in the absence of federal leadership.
In sum, creating dynamism can be viewed as an iterative process of de- and
reconstructing responsibility for treaty implementation over time. Dynamism
requires the construction of boundaries that are clear enough to protect subna-
tional initiatives but also porous enough to permit dialogue and exchange.
Creating dynamism also requires breaking down treaty ideals into actionable
tasks while building understanding of how individual interactions between the
state and its citizens contribute to satisfying the United States' commitments
under these international instruments. These complexities help to explain why
both federal and subnational actors. continue to seek the clarity of dualism, even
in projects that are not conducive to this model of divided authority. Nonethe-
less, because dualism and dynamism are not binary opposites, there are con-
crete, incremental steps that can be taken to stimulate increased federal-
subnational interaction over these treaty norms. Federal leadership and support
would certainly advance this project dramatically, but even in its absence, hu-
man rights advocacy organizations can provide the administrative structure to
draw connections between local advocacy and international legal obligation.
186. CERD, supra note io, at 220, 222.
187. ICESCR, supra note 9, at 7.
188. Given that the United States has ratified only those treaties with which it believes
the country is already in compliance, state and local actions toward meeting treaty
standards may be a necessary forerunner to treaty ratification.
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This mode of implementation is sometimes criticized for being slow and
uneven. Without minimizing the very real problems of rejection and noncom-
pliance, I suggest that these arguments fail to acknowledge the distinctive nature
of human rights treaties. Unlike the other instruments discussed here, these
treaties are arguably process-driven rather than outcome-driven."9 They
require ongoing evaluation of the relationship between domestic law at all levels
and the treaties' substantive commitments. They are therefore in some ways
uniquely suited to an incremental, dialogic implementation approach. The ben-
efits that can thus be gained from dynamism may help to balance out the
certainty and efficiency that are lost in the rejection of a top-down, coercive
approach to implementation.
CONCLUSION
Dualism lives on in the way that state and local actors view both the prac-
tice and the promise of international human rights treaties. This need not be
the case, however. Because of federalism understandings, the structure already
exists for state and local initiatives to explore ways to actualize these treaties'
guarantees. The challenge lies in encouraging broader and deeper engagement
within this space. I have suggested strategies through which both public and
private actors could begin to stimulate this kind of activity as a way of exploring
the meaning of these treaties, building support for them domestically, and,
thus, more fully realizing the United States' international commitments. The
promise of dynamism also extends beyond the unique case of the human rights
treaties to a broader range of international obligations, but its contours do and
should vary depending on the nature of the project in question. The idea of dy-
namism captures the range of possible federal-subnational relationships that
exist whenever the absence of federal legislation creates the possibility for varia-
tion at the subnational level. The mechanisms of promoting participation can
be more or less coercive depending on the political and structural pressures at
play within a particular project. Even, however, where treaty obligations are
more concrete, dynamism can serve the important goal of preventing stasis and
ossification in the state of the law over time. In a time when the realities of do-
mestic politics make it unlikely that the nation will make bold new international
commitments to human rights, dynamism offers a powerful mechanism for
stimulating the domestic dialogue in ways that will ensure a fuller realization of
our existing international obligations and that will lay the groundwork for the
adoption of increased human rights protections in the future.
121
189. This also helps to explain the United States' somewhat contradictory position that
these treaties were both implemented at the time of ratification and yet still the re-
sponsibility of state and local government to implement. See supra notes 101-103
and accompanying text.

